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ABSTRACT
Nuclear Diffusion: A Rethinking o f  Horizontal Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation examines the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the 
nuclear age. What is pondered are the specific reasons why a state 
would pursue a nuclear weapons deterrent. For example, are there 
identifiable reasons or conditions that explain h orizon ^  nuclear 
weapons proliferation? While numerous arguments have been made 
for why countries proliferate, this piece posits a simple assumption.
A non-nuclear state is inclined to proliferate because of the dramatic 
nature of the nuclear threat. The imperiled non-nuclear state prefers to 
proliferate as only the nuclear deterrent ensures relative security in an 
anarchic nuclear-armed world. Whereas peace may prevail in the absence 
of nuclear weapons, relative security demands the imperilled state to 
question whether it needs nuclear weapons. Should a state desire to remove 
vulnerability, it is the unfortunate reality of the nuclear age that nuclear 
peace must begin and end with the nuclear weapon.
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Introduction
A s a  contem porary analysis of international security  affairs this work 
a d d re s se s  the  effects of th e  atom ic bomb on the  relations betw een non-nuclear 
w eapon sta te s. A cadem ics and stra teg ists, for instance, have long deba ted  how 
the bomb altered th e  nature of international relations. At th e  very least, the  atom ic 
bomb did alter the  intrinsic co sts  a sso c ia ted  with in tersta te  conflict. Still, a  m ore 
definitive answ er a s  to how the atomic bomb directly affected the  behavior of sta tes 
remains elusive. H ence, this work endeavors  to provide a  fundam ental answ er to 
this important question - how has the atomic bomb change the affairs between states?
The nuclear innocence d isappeared  with "the flash es  o f . . .  [the first] th ree  
atomic devices in th e  sum m er of 1945, a t A lam agordo, and  over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki."^ With th ese  th ree  explosions, the atomic bom b b ecam e an irremovable 
aspec t of international affairs. It w as  not until later, however, that the atomic bom b's 
national security connotations would surface. T h e se  connotations em erged  once 
adversaries b ecam e arm ed with this new  and powerful w eapon.
The stra teg ic  role of th e  atom ic bom b changed  in 1949. The Soviet
Bernard Brodie, War and Politics. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973, p. 376.
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detonation of an atom ic device m arked the loss of th e  American atom ic monopoly, 
signaled the  arrival of atom ic-arm ed opponents, and  created the  possibility for 
atomic war. Fortunately, a  nuclear war, long feared by m any as  inevitable, h a s  yet 
to occur. Still, the  risk of nuclear war persists  even  to this day.
T he end of the  Cold W ar betw een the  two primary nuclear protagonists - the  
Soviet Union and the United S ta tes  - considerably w aned the threat a  global nuclear 
war. Yet, th e  ch an ce  of a  post-Cold W ar nuclear exchange lingers on. In fact, 
b ecau se  th e  atom ic w eap o n  rem ains available a s  a  tool of force, th e  possibility of 
a  nuclear clash rem ains undaunted  by the  dem ise  of th e  Cold War. However, the  
th reat of nuclear a ttack  is supposedly  mitigated by the ex istence of nuclear 
d eterrence. Specifically, a  nuclear w eap o n s-b ased  deterrent is supp o sed  to, in 
theory, de te r  an  a ttack  by an  atom ic-arm ed opponent. Ironically, it is this very 
deterrent quality that contributes to the  political effects th a t nuclear w eapons have, 
and have had, on th e  behavior of non-nuclear w eapon  states.
T he nuclear w eapon  s ta te  (NWS) derives a  theoretical deterren t from its 
possession  of a  sovereign nuclear w eapons capability. In contrast, th e  non-nuclear 
w eapons s ta te  (NNWS) m ust a ccep t the  resounding strategic implications th a t 
com e with nuclear asym m etry. The operating reality th at the NNW S-state m ust 
confront is that it lacks th e  essen tia l nuclear m eans to d e te r  a nuclear threat. T he 
nature of this nuclear threat, a s  could be  confronted by a  NNWS-state, includes the  
possibility of nuclear coercion, th rea t of nuclear attack, even an  actual nuclear 
strike. Thus, for the  NNW S-state, nuclear w eapons exist a s  the sta rkest rem inder
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of w hat price it m ay h ave  to b ea r from its relative w eak n ess  in an  essential 
capability.
The a b se n c e  of a  sovereign nuclear deterren t implies th at not even an 
implausible nuclear th rea t is deterred . A th rea tened  NN W S-state can  only deter 
possible nuclear aggression  by acquiring an  analogous and  sovereign nuclear 
w eapons capability. As a  result, if the  NNW S-state se e k s  to e s c a p e  the  strategic 
implications of nuclear vulnerability, it m ust "go nuclear." In o ther words, the 
NNW S-state which is th rea ten ed  by nuclear arm s m ust pu rsue  the  only capability 
which can alleviate its relative insecurities.
Essentially, the  question that m ust be asked  is w hat form of behavior should 
be  expected  from an imperiled NN W S-state? If a  NN W S-states perceives an 
unmitigated exogenous nuclear th reat is it not logical th at the  s ta te  proliferates not 
only to mitigate th e  threat, but b e c au se  the  logic of nuclear d e te rrence  dem ands 
subsequent proliferation? Again, a  NNW S-state that w ishes to deter m ust possess 
the  essential nuclear m ean s with which to deter. Therefore, a  pattern to how 
NNW S-states proliferate should be  d iscernable given the universal logic of nuclear 
deterrence. Put differently, the  desire  to d e te r the  nuclear th reat should lead 
proliferation to follow a similar p rocess and pattem  of developm ent in which an initial 
nuclear-arm ed s ta te  c re a tes  the  impetus that sp u rs  su b seq u en t proliferation.
The reason  a pattem  to proliferation is to b e  expected  is th at the imperiled 
NNWS-state se ek s  to maintain a  relative level of security with a  threatening NWS- 
state. Desire for relative security in a  nuclear arm ed milieu implies that the  NNWS-
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State  should be encouraged  to  pu rsue an  analogous and  sovereign nuclear 
w eap o n s-b ased  deterren t. In e s se n c e , w hat is argued is that the em ergence  of 
n uc lear threat serves to promote subsequent acts o f  horizontal nuclear weapons 
proliferation.
T he intent of this piece is to  show  that a c ts  of horizontal proliferation a re  the  
c o n seq u e n c e  of prior ac ts  of nuclear fruition. The key assum ption is that the  
historical developm ent of horizontal nuclear w eapons proliferation has followed a  
distinct pattern that involved p as t nuclear-arm ed s ta te s  creating the  strategic 
im petus for additional proliferation. This described pattern of developm ent is 
labelled the  p rocess of nuclear diffusion^
In order to explain the  dynam ic of diffusion, a  theory is first constructed. 
Diffusion theory will help establish the underlying logic behind the conclusions that 
o n e  can  summarily draw  concerning the expected  behavior of NNW S-states. In 
addition, a  region of NN W S-states is exam ined with resp ec t to its susceptibility to 
n uc lear diffusion. The piece e n d s  with certain policy options being proposed to 
preven t nuclear diffusion. The overall structure of the  work is a s  follows.
T he first chap ter highlights the  international context of insecurity and  
system ic complexity within which all s ta te s  operate. The conceptual understanding 
o f the  four following com ponen ts helps estab lish  and clarify the  effects a  chaotic
- The distinction between diffusion and proliferation is not a semantic one. Diffusion is 
different from proliferation in that it represents a pattem to proliferation. The act of proliferation 
itself represents the instance a NNWS-state goes nuclear.
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Operating milieu h as  on the  behavior o f sta tes. T hese com ponents include: (1) the 
a narchy  of international relations; (2) th e  limits of a  system ic structure; (3) the 
em erg en ce  of th e  security dilemma; and, (4) the  geopolitical environm ent a s  it 
in teracts \with the security dilemma.
The seco n d  chapter validates a  critical assum ption to nuclear diffusion theory 
by identifying the  atom ic bom b's strateg ic and political u n iqueness. The chapter 
exam ines: (1) why nuclear w eapons a re  strategically atypical; and , (2) the  political 
effects that follow from the  nuclear w eapon.
C hap ter th ree  offers a  fundam ental rethinking of w hy NN W S-states 
proliferate by presenting the  theory of nuclear diffusion.
C hapter four tes ts  diffusion theory through a  historical examination of the first 
p h ase  of proliferation. T he importance of examining the first ph ase  is to question the 
validity of diffusion theory.
The fifth chapter explores nuclear diffusion in the  second  p h a se  of horizontal 
proliferation. The distinction of the seco n d  p h ase  is m ad e  by examining: (1) the 
o p aq u e  ch arac te r of se co n d -p h ase  proliferation; (2) th e  current role played by 
civilian-related nuclear capabilities; (3) a listing of the essen tia l m ea n s  necessary  
for a nuclear w eap o n s capability; and, (4) the p resent post-Cold W ar strategic 
context.
The sixth chap ter exam ines the  prospects of nuclear diffusion within 
Northeast Asia by focusing on: (1) the  regional repercussions of th e  post-Cold W ar 
period; (2) a  recognition of the  past role played by nuclear w eapons; and, (3) an  in­
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depth s ta te  by s ta te  examination of civilian-related nuclear pow er capabilities.
C h ap ter sev en  spotlights the  deg ree  of external th rea t p resen t within the  
N ortheast Asian th ea te r  by assess in g : (1) the  region's military expenditures, 
capabilities, and potential; and, (2) th e  particular security context feced  by each  
N ortheast Asian sta te .
The eighth ch ap ter offers a s e t  of policy recom m endations developed from 
the  logic of diffusion theory. The array of policies chosen  a re  designed  to construct 
th e  m ost fruitful stra tegy  with which to arrest th e  tide of intra-regional nuclear 
diffusion. The th ree  policy options proposed are: (1) support for multilateral and 
unilateral m easu res  of denial; (2) the  unequivocal and continued endorsem ent of 
security gu a ran tees; and, (3) a  radical strategy for diffusion-prevention.
Chapter nine ends this work with a  conclusion that sum m arizes the p apers 
key findings with so m e additional rem arks by the  author.
Before beginning, it m ust first be  stated that th e  intent of this th esis  is to 
broaden the  understanding  of a  strategic issue with incredible im portance for 
in terstate affairs. T he issu e  of horizontal nuclear w eapons proliferation dem ands 
concern  for th e  sim ple reason  th a t th e  specter of nuclear w ar and nuclear threat 
continue to plague the  post-Cold W ar era . In addition, there  a re  reaso n ab le  fears 
that a s  the  num ber of N W S-states increase so d o es  the  probability and  proclivity for
R eprodu ced  with p erm ission  of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission .
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nuclear war.^ In any c ase , a  sound  theory that explains why NN W S-states "go 
nuclear" a ssis ts  the  developm ent of s tra teg ies that should prove helpful in 
stem m ing the tide of future proliferation.
 ̂ The pro- and anti-proliferation sides both differ on the consequences of further 
proliferation. The intent of this thesis, however, is not to delve into whether proliferation is more 
or less stable. For a pro-proliferation argument see: Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons: More May be Better," Adelphi Papers. No. 171. London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies.
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Chapter 1; A Thgoretkal Framework
In W ar and  Politics, the  author, stra teg ic  thinker Bernard Brodie, a sk s  a 
s im ple penetrating question, "De quoi s 'ag it il - W hat is it all about?"’ S ince this 
analysis  posits a  new  theory to explain th e  ac t of horizontal nuclear w eap o n s 
proliferation, Brodie’s  question offers the  m ost appropriate of starting points.
- "De quoi s'agit il? -
Horizontal nuclear w eap o n s proliferation is all abou t the need  of s ta te s  to 
p o s s e s s  th e  essen tia l m eans for national security. The impetus behind the ac t of 
proliferation is a  reflection of a  NN W S-state's d esire  for relative national security. 
More to  th e  point, the  act of horizontal nuclear w eap o n s proliferation is a  NNWS- 
sta te 's  reaction to  the  disturbing "existential" th reat posed by another nuclear-armed 
s ta te . In other words, relative security d em an d s th at th e  threatened  a re  ab le  to 
deter, and nuclear deterrence dem ands that the  th reatened  NNWS-state proliferate.
• Brodie, op. cit„ p. 91.
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Proliferation is a  reflection of the  system ic limits im posed on relative security. 
T h ese  limits a re  im posed on all s ta te s. No s ta te  can  rem ove oneself from the 
implications of th e s e  limits a s  the nature of the international system  is one in which 
threats perm eate . As a  result, th e  context in which s ta te s  o p e ra te  is conducive to 
the instigation of proliferation. Moreover, an  act of horizontal proliferation m ay be 
the m ost logical reaction a NNW S-state takes given that it o p e ra te s  within an  
environm ent that is endem ic with risk and fram ed by the system ic co n seq u en ces  
of anarchy.
T he notion of system ic anarchy is fundam ental to  the  explanation of why 
horizontal proliferation is best understood through the  paradigm  of nuclear diffusion 
B ecau se  anarchy  is held a s  th e  underlying constant condition within a  s ta te 's  
environment, its co n seq u en ces  for relative security have important implications for 
why nuclear diffusion is an  international phenom ena.
Understanding the  relationship betw een anarchy and  insecurity, and  thus 
b e tw een  anarchy  and  nuclear diffusion, is accom plished by uniting elem ents of 
various international theories. This theoretical approach  includes all th ree  
d esig n a ted  levels of analysis - th e  system , the sta te , and  m an. While a  hybrid 
approach  m ay se em  unnecessary , such a theoretical app ro ach  will help 
conceptualize  th e  intricate relationship betw een insecurity, anarchy, and nuclear 
diffusion.-
" In order to hedge dispute with this approach, a synthetic presentation of international 
relations is by no means novel. For example, scholars Snyder and Diesing have submitted tli t̂ the
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A Theoretical Context for Diffusion,
Much of th e  international relations literature focu ses  directly on the  question 
of system ic security and order. W here an enorm ous distinction exists is betw een 
the notions of o rd er and security p resent a t the  dom estic  and  international levels. 
Since th ere  is no corollary to th e  dom estic governm ent a t  th e  international level, 
much thought h a s  b een  given to the effect th at th e  lack of a  sovereign power h as  
on the behavior of individual sta te s. Undeniably evident is that th e  lack of a  clear 
order h a s  fram ed th e  context within which all s ta te s  interact.
This context, so  important to the understanding  of nuclear diffusion, can be 
examined through four e lem ents. To aid the  explanation, th ese  four elem ents a re  
divided into two interrelated areas. The first a re a  es tab lish es  th e  elem ents 
important for an  appreciation of the system . T he seco n d  a re a  draw s upon 
reductionist e lem en ts a s  they  intrude upon a  s ta te ’s  operating milieu. Collectively, 
th ese  e lem en ts aid  th e  forthcoming analysis by establishing the  context within 
which th e  behavior of proliferation originates. T he explanation of the context 
begins with the effects  anarchy h as  on international security.
failings of general theories justify a more ambitious multi-level of analysis or synthetic theoretical 
approach. See: Glen Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 1977.
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Anarchy
The notion of anarchy describes th e  condition that exists in th e  a b se n c e  of 
structure  or order. It is the condition th a t develops a s  no group or s ta te  h as  th e  
sovereign pow er to  compel conformity o r coerce  adherence  am ong and  betw een 
all s ta tes. As such, each  s ta te  opera tes  within an intemational system  in which no 
recognized sovereign body exists ab o v e  th e  pow er of the individual s ta te . As a 
result, lack of order, and the  potential for violent disorder, prevail a s  characteristics 
of the  interstate system . As scholar K enneth Waltz suggests, anarchy’s  implications 
for international security a re  both profound and  poignant:
...international anarchy m ean s th e  a b sen c e  of a common inter-state 
governm ent. Yet ...sta tes do  not believe th a t the  lack of a  com m on 
governm ent m ean s that no agency  can  reliably enforce prom ises. 
Instead, ...sta tes recognize that, in anarchy, there  is no overarching 
authority to prevent others from using violence or the  th rea t of 
violence to destroy or enslave them .^
W hile the  condition of anarchy  is ever-present, its m ost poignant 
consequences, such a s  war, are by no m ean s a  constant occurrence. Sem blances 
of order, for exam ple, can develop and  persist for d ecad es  within th e  g rea te r 
intem ational system  in spite of the  underlying reality of anarchy. N evertheless, 
there  is no order that rem oves the effects that anarchy persists to h ave  ev en  w hen
 ̂ Joseph M, Grieco, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest 
liberal institutionalism," IntemationaLOrganizations. volume 42, no.3. Summer 1988, p.497-498.
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war is not co n s ta n t/  Specifically, no actor can e s c a p e  the connotations of anarchy 
a s  th ere  exists no sovereign entity which e n su re s  th e  security of the  sta te . The 
security th a t the  s ta te  d o e s  experience is a t th e  ex p e n se  of its power and  the  
m ean s a t its disposal. Put differently, in th e  a b s e n c e  of a  true world governm ent, 
e a ch  s ta te  con tends within an  international sy stem  in which disorder and  conflict 
remain possible b e c au se  there  is nothing to m ake  th e s e  ev en ts  impossible.
The reality of anarchy is that each  intemational sta te  m ust by itself seek  the  
m eans for national security since the "prerequisite to achieving any  s ta te  goal"® lie 
with its intrinsic ability to provide national security. T he stark  reality im posed by 
anarchy  is that every sovereign sta te  confront th rea ts  that a re  "total, rising all the  
way to  th e  actual u se  of force ...and th rea t of ...war."® Even in peace , no sta te  
entirely e s c a p e s  the connotations of anarchy a s  p e a ce  m ay alw ays end.
W hat anarchy  implies is that th rea ts  to  security  exist b e c au se  th ere  exists 
nothing to  prevent th e  exploitation of th e  s ta te  accep t th e  force of th e  s ta te . 
Consequently, th e  condition of anarchy c re a te s  and  fosters a  systemic-wide 
operating environm ent fram ed by the constant risks posed by interstate disorder.
' For a differing view on anarchy, one which asserts that the intemational svstem is 
hierarchically ordered, and not anarchic: See: A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War 
Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1980. The effect of such a hierarchically-ordered 
system on the prospects for nuclear diffusion is limited since no one intemational stmcture can 
forever remove the nuclear threat a non-nuclear state may confront.
® Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of IntemationalPoIitics. London: .Addison-WesIey Publishing 
Company, 1979, p. 91.
' Hoffman, op. d l.. p. 135.
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insecurity, and conflict.
The consequence  of anarchy for s ta te  behavior Is that "self-help" em erges  
a s  the  presiding dictum for intem ational affairs: since no s ta te  "enjoys even an 
im perfect g uaran tee  of their security un less they se t out to  provide for it 
themselves."^ In other words, the  onus for security befalls entirely upon the  power 
available to the sta te . This need  for pow er contributes to  w hat is an  alm ost 
unending "struggle for power."® This struggle for power contributes to  the  eventual 
em erg en ce  of structure within th e  system  th at has certain theoretical implications 
for international security.
The Structure of the System
A system ic theory se ek s  to explain "how the organization of the  
(intemational) realm ac ts  a s  a  constraining and  disposing force on the  interacting 
units within it."® T he "system  is ...com posed of two related parts: ...structure, and 
...interacting units."’® T he structure is itself defined by the  positions held by each  
sta te  unit a s  based  on their level of relative power. A transform ation in th e  order of 
structure occurs in reaction to  the "changes in the distribution of capabilities ac ro ss
’ Ibid.. p. 201.
’ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1978., p. 30. 
' Waltz, fip. d l.. p. 72.
-  Ibid- p. 72.
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th e  system ."”  Overall, the  international system  may reflect num erous structural 
constitutions a s  power, derived from economic, political, and  military capabilities, 
concentrates am ong the system 's primary actors. For exam ple, the  following types 
of system ic structures a re  no ted” ^
(a) Hierarchial - The concentration of power in o n e  unit.
(B) Diffuse - Pow er and  influence a re  distributed widely am ong the
interacting units.
(C) Diffuse-Bloc - Blocs of s ta te s  in opposition to  o n e  another.
(D) Polar - Dominant bloc lead ers  lead over lesser units.
(E) Multi-polar - More flexibility betw een the blocs, and g rea te r latitude
of choice am ong the  interacting units.
While each  of the  above-m entioned structures p ro fess different 
c o n seq u e n c e s  for system ic behavior and international s e c u r i t y ,n o  structural 
constitution can rem ove each  and  every s ta te  from the connotations of anarchy. A 
particular structure may arguably tem per certain systemic instabilities, but no order
-- Ibid. p. 97.
K. J. Holsti. International Politics; A Framework for Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall. 1972. p. 90.
The debate between power transitionists who contend that a more preponderant 
international structure is stable, and balance of power theorists, who consider a balance among states 
as more preferable to stability and peace, continues. In terms of international structure, power 
transitionists hold that a hierarchical ^stem in which power is concentrated is the most preferable 
system, whereas balance of power advocates stress the value of a diffuse system in which power is 
equally balanced across a number of states, or alliances.
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rem oves th e  perils that eventually a rise  within any  structure. Anarchy still leads 
e a ch  sovereign s ta te  to p repare  a s  if today 's  p e a ce  m ay en d  tomorrow. National 
security, in o ther words, is not safeguard  by th e  p resen ce  of bi-polarity, multi­
polarity, or unipolarity, but rem ains forever relative to the  external threats operating 
within a  sta te 's  environm ent.
B ecause of the  persisting connotations of anarchy, each  imperiled s ta te  m ust 
be "ready either to counter force with force or pay th e  cost of w eakness."”  Since 
no order provides for the individual security of every sta te , successfully mitigating 
a  th rea t require the  imperiled to  gain in power. The pursuit for power, however, 
contributes to  an  added  dilem ma th at the imperiled can  not avoid.
The Security Dilemma
Si vis pacem, para helium 
- If you want peace, prepare for war -
Reductionist theories a re  concerned  with the  c a u se s  of international 
p henom ena that originate a t th e  individual and/or national level. The reductionist 
orientation concludes that a  s ta te 's  declared  policy is se t down by "governm ents 
through individual policy-makers."^® Priority, however, m ust be  given to issu es  that
Kenneth Waltz, Man. the State and War. New York: Columbia University Press. 1959.,
p. 160.
Brodie, OIL. dî-, P -1 
Holsti, op. cit. p. 131.
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deal with relative security  since national security m ust first b e  e n su red  prior to the  
pursuit of any  o ther g o a ls  th e  s ta te  m ay have. As a  result, it is not surprising th at 
national security b eco m es  a  p reem inent concern even  during obvious periods of 
peace .
W hen a  decision-m aker perceives a  th rea t to security, an  appropriate 
reaction m ust be  determ ined. A weak state, for example, m ay "not be  interested ... 
in a  balance...w hich is in their favor...but a  general m argin...[could be] the  
objective."”  As scho lar Nicholas Spykm an adds, m aybe "there is no real security 
in being just a s  strong a s  a  potential enem y, th ere  is security only in being a little 
stronger."’® T he quandary  is that s te p s  that bolster the  strength of o n e  s ta te  alter 
th e  b a s is  by which o th er s ta te s  calculate their relative security. This particular 
quandary  is referred to a s  the  "security dilem ma."’®
T h e security dilem m a results w hen "an increase in o n e  s ta te 's  security 
d e c re a s e s  th e  security of others."^® According to the  logic of th e  dilem ma, s ta te s  
in seeking  their own security  "get too much and too little - too m uch b e c a u se  they
”  Nicholas J. Spykman, "Traditional Theory; Balance of Power," in Contending Theories 
of International Relations, ed. by James E. Dougherty, and Robert L. Pflatzgraff, Jr. New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers. 1990., p. 33.
Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. Princeton; Princeton University 
Press, 1978, p. 169.
Robert Jervis, "Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma," in International Politics: 
Eiiduring_ConceDt5 and Contemporary Issues ed. by Robert J. Art and, Robert Jervis. New York: 
Harper Collins Publisher. 1992, p. 146.
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gain th e  ability to carry ou t aggression: too little because  others, being m enaced , 
will increase  their arm s an d  so reduce the  first sta te 's  security."^’ Further intensifying 
the  cycle of action-reaction is that th e  imperiled will often estab lish  th e  credibility of 
a n  external threat a s  being "co-extensive with...[certain essential] capabilities."^ 
Certain types of threatening capabilities, in o ther words, skew  perceptions and fuel 
a  dangerous spiral of insecurity betw een competing s ta tes.
The security dilem m a develops b e c au se  an  operating environm ent is often 
sh ared  by th e  threatening  and th e  th rea tened . B ecause percep tions of external 
environm ent a re  w hat often justify the  imperiled sta te 's  reaction, a  "s ta tesm en 's  
perceptual thresholds...[could] be  ad justed  accordingly and...[m ay] be  quick to  
perceive am biguous evils a s  indicating that others a re  aggressive."^® T h ese  
perceptions a re  further ex ace rb a ted  by the  realization that "today's friend m ay b e  
tomorrow's enemy."^" Consequently, persistent concem s over national security fuel 
th e  possibility for m isperception, and  reactions to m isperceptions lead  decision­
m akers to "plan capabilities for future u se  ... [on mere] a ssum ptions  abou t future 
contingencies."^®
-- Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. New York: New 
York University Press. 1976, p. 64.
“  Ibid. p. 65.
Jervis. (1992), op. cit. p. 148.
Grieco, op. cit.. p. 487.
Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, The International Svstem. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 1961. p. 131.
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T he actual perception of th e  th reat represents, however, only one component 
of the  security dilemma. O nce  a  s ta te 's  decision-m akers react, they  m ust also 
determ ine what form of power m ust b e  pursued to rem ove the th reat. Determining 
th e  required capabilities for national security eventually lead s ta te  decision-m aker's 
to  com pare essen tia l capabilities with th o se  th a t threaten . This comparison, 
be tw een  the th reatened  and th e  threatening , contributes to a  "tendency toward 
sa m e n e ss  of the competitors."^ Put differently, b ecau se  security is contingent upon 
th e  capabilities held by th e  strong, the  w eak  m ust "imitate their rivals successful 
characteristics:"^^
...it is to be expected  th a t in crucial resp ec ts  ...pow ers will look and 
ac t very m uch alike. It is a lso  to be  expected  that sam en ess-effec t 
imperatives will impel eligible s ta te s  to  becom e g rea t pow ers and to 
acquire all th e  capabilities a tten d an t to  that status.^®
The notion of a "sam en ess  effect" (this thesis coins it emulation” ) is the by­
product of the security dilem ma and an  anarchic international environment. 
Emulation in inclined to occur since the  w eak realize that furthering national security
Waltz, (1979) op. cit. p. 127.
Christopher La>-ne, " The Unipolar Illusion," International Security, vol. 17. no. 4. Fall 
1993. p. 15.
=« m i .  p. 15.
= - The term "emulation" is mirrored with a similar term utilized by Randolph Silverson and 
Harvey Starr, The Diffusion of War; A Studv of Ooportunitv and Willingness. Detroit: University 
of Michigan Press. 1991. p. 10-75.
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d e p e n d s  on the 'right" capabilities. To u se  an  analogy for clarification, a  sta te  
th reatened  by another's potent naval capabilities d o es  not build a  stronger army but 
will develop - if possible - an  even  m ore potent navy. Emulation, therefore, is the 
logical response since relative security requires that power be  derived from the right 
type of capabilities. The source for emulation, however, is influenced by th e  actors 
that opera te  within the th rea ten ed 's  geopolitical milieu.
The Geopolitical Environment
T he a rea  in which a  s ta te  contends, operates, and interacts, in g rea test 
frequency, roughly defines its geopolitical environment. The s ize  and extent of this 
operating realm will differ for each  s ta te . For som e strong s ta te s  this operating 
realm  m ay prove quite large, while s ta te s  of m ore limited capabilities m ay interact 
within a  sm aller milieu. N evertheless, th e  geopolitical milieu affects a  policy­
m aker’s  perceptions by producing a  so-called "neighbor effect."
T he neighbor effect rep resen ts  th e  influence spatial proximity h as  upon a 
s ta te 's  national security calculations.®® A neighbor effect occurs b ecau se  "conditions 
in neighboring s ta tes do have an effect on contiguous areas."®’ T he neighbor effect 
also reveals how a policy-maker's behavior is impacted by "geographic proximity.
Silverson and Starr, p. 28.
Ibid. p. 28.
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offensive capability, and perceived intentions."®^ Still, th e  term  "neighbor effect" is 
only used a s  an allegory to th e  geopolitical "context... th at sh ap es  the  dynam ics and 
opportunities" p resen t \within any  intemational system  or structure.®®
In order to  avoid outright determinism, ano ther term , "ease o f  interaction" 
rep laces  this notion of neighbor effect. ^  In com parison, e a se  of interaction 
incorporates both spatial proximity and a s ta te 's  available capabilities in order to 
estim ate  the  actual spatial proximity betw een actors. T hose  s ta te s  that a re  
determ ined to sh a re  an  e a s e  of interaction a re  a d d re sse d  a s  "salient others.
A salient o th er is an  exam ple of the  s ta te  th at is m ost likely to affect and 
influence the  calculations relevant to national security. Of course , th e  influence of 
a  salien t other is by no m ean s absolute. The relationship betw een an operating 
milieu, a salient o ther, and relative security calculations, is thought of in possibiUstic 
or probabilistic terms; that is, the  actions of a salient other do  not determ ine the 
resulting behavior of another state.®® Therefore, a  salient o ther is to b e  viewed only
Jervis, (1979), op. cit. p. 152-153. 
Silverson and Starr, op. cit. p. 27-31. 
” Ibid. p. 20-30.
Ibid.
Harold and Margaret Sprout. The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: with Special 
Reference to International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1965.
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a s  a  conditioning factor upon eventual behavior.®^
A Concluding Overview of Chapter One
The first chapter so u g h t to dem onstrate the  p revalence and  effects of 
international insecurity upon in terstate behavior. A further aim w as to  em phasize 
th e  constancy of anarchy and  to show  its implications for national security, and 
proliferant-type behaviour. T h e  im age drawn by the  analysis w as th a t a  NNWS- 
s ta te  interacts within an operating system  filled with possible risks brought on by the 
implications that follow from international anarchy. In o ther words, th e  operating 
reality of the system ic environm ent c re a tes  the  conditions by which th e  imperiled 
becom e imperilled. Consequently, th e  NNWS-state, when th reatened  by a  nuclear­
arm ed "salient other," m ust decide betw een becoming a nuclear w eapons-sta te  for 
the  sa k e  of relative security or accepting the resounding implications of nuclear 
vulnerability.
Since the connotations of anarchy prevail within th e  international system , 
diffusion theory a ssu m es that an  imperiled NNWS-state prefers nuclear strength to 
n uclear w eakness. In doing so, however, the former NN W S-state c reates a 
fundam ental security dilem ma in which proliferation b eg e ts  nuclear threat, and
John O'Loughlin, and Luc Anselin, "Geography and Intemational Conflict and 
Cooperation: theory and Methods," in The New Geopolitics, ed. Michael don Ward, Philadelphia: 
Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1992, p. 14.
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nuclear th rea t simply b eg e ts  proliferation. In o ther words, s ta te s  acquire nuclear 
w eap o n s  b e c au se  relative security in the  nuclear ag e  d em an d s deterrence, and 
de te rren ce  requires the  p o ssess io n  of nuclear w eapons.
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Chapter 2; Rethinking Proliferation
An act of horizontal nuclear w eapons proliferation is a  reaction by a  NNWS- 
s ta te  to  an operating milieu underscored by th e  implications of nuclear-arm ed 
anarchy. B ecause  of anarchy, and the  security  implications th at follow, a  
d iscernable pattern to  proliferation em erged  within th e  nuclear age. T he theory of 
nuclear diffusion theory se ek s  to explain this pattern of developm ent a s  a  dynamic 
unique to  the  p ro cess  of horizontal proliferation. T he entire logic of the  theory of 
nuclear diffusion res ts  on th e  fundam ental assum ption  that the  destructive nature 
of the  atom ic bom b incites NNW S-states to em ulate  th e  capabilities of a 
threatening NW S-state.
The Absolute Weapon: JheJNucIearJBomb
T he power of the  atom ic bomb stem s form its unique and incredible capacity 
to destroy .’ As a w eapon  of war it is the  an tithesis  to m ore traditional military
- K J. Holsti. Internationa] Politics; A Framework for Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall. 1972.
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w eap o n s b ecau se  of its destructive capacity. As such, since th e  dawning of the 
nuclear age, the  only military utility of the  bomb has b een  to d e te r  war; that is, 
except for the  first and  only instance of atomic u se  by the U.S. in 1945. As Thom as 
C. Schelling did observe, th e  co sts  associated  with "nuclear w eap o n s  m ake war 
less  military and a re  responsible for the lowered s ta tu s  of military victory."® 
N evertheless, while it m ay lack in military utility, the stra teg ic  utility of the  bomb 
resides in its ex istence a s  the  only the  w eapon that d e te rs  the  exploitation of the  
nuclear w eapons option.
ironically, the  atom ic bom b represents the  quintessential de te rren t and the  
g rea te s t th reat faced by any sta te . This duality is th e  result of a n  unparalleled 
destructive nature that is comprised of a capacity to inflict enorm ous d a m a g e  upon 
o n e 's  opponent a t inconceivable levels in an unimaginably short duration of time. 
Again, the  atomic bom b th rea ten s  and d e te rs  b ecau se  it is th e  m ost powerful 
capability th at any s ta te  could confront or have at its disposal. Q uite simple, it 
th reatens so  dramatically a s  there is an incredible distinction betw een conventional 
and nuclear war;
- Thomas C. Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," in International Politics, ed. Robert 
J. Art and Robert Jervis. Harper Collins: New York. 1992. p. 126.
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It is imaginable that w e might destroy 200,000,000 R ussians in a  w ar 
of th e  present, though not 80,000,000 Ja p an e se  in the  w ar of th e  
past. It is not only imaginable, it is imagined. It is imagined b e c au se  
it could be  d one  "in a  m om ent, in the  twinkling of an  eye.®
T he birth of the  nuclear w eapon m arks what m ust be  considered  a s  the 
epochal change in the  co s ts  a sso c ia ted  with interstate war.'’ The atom ic bom b is 
th e  only w eapon th at com bines an  indefensible quality with an  inordinate and 
unparalleled d eg ree  of destructive force.® As such, the  bom b is dissimilar from 
o ther w eapons "not only in th e  scale  of destruction ...but in... [the] speed"® in 
which th e  destruction shall com e. Its effect on international affairs w as  th at the 
"magnitude and sp eed  of the  change  in hum an destructive capacity" ch an g ed  the 
nature of s ta tecraft by introducing an  existential threat. ® Put differently, th e  bomb 
is the  only w eapon that e n d an g ers  the  very ex istence of a  given sta te .
® Ibid. p. 124.
" Ibid., p. 126,
 ̂ Although SDI and other variations of an ABM system have been explored, and the patriot 
missile system offers some promise of a very limited land-based defensive system, there was, and 
there is, no defensive sy stem which can remove the vulnerability that states to continue to endure. 
See. Barry R. Schneider and Colin S. Gray, "Defending versus avenging: a critical assessment of SDI 
and MAD policies," in Space Weapons and Intemational Securitv. ed. Bhupendra Jasani. Stockholm: 
Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 113-25.
' Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. 
1989. p. 6.
 ̂ Michael Mandelbaum. The Nuclear Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982, p. 13.
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Overall, various intrinsic qualities cap tu re  how much of a  threat th e  atomic 
bom b truly rep resen ts. Specifically, (a) the  only existential form of destructive 
power;® (b) a  dramatic sp eed  in which the  destruction follows th e  nuclear exchange; 
(c) absolutely indefensible; and, (d) both im m ediate and long-term environm ental 
effects.® T hese  four qualities helped create th e  perception that the  bomb w as unlike 
any  o ther w eapon. The strategic distinction of this w eapon is easily established 
once the calam itous effects of a twenty-kiloton atom ic w eapon are com pared with 
o ther w eapons of m ass  destruction: (See: T able 1.):
The Effects o f a 20-Kiloton Weapon
. 600 fee t wide and 40 feet d e e p  crater;
. Destruction of all types of buildings within a  2 .0  mile radius;
. Fire-storm destroys everything within the 0.7 mile radius;’®
 ̂ In order to avoid any confusion over the use of this term, I am referring to the ability of 
nuclear weapons to destroy the existence of the state. Clearly, no weapon has ever had the ability 
to remove a state from the international system. The nuclear weapon is the only example of a weapon 
with such an existential quality.
 ̂ These points are a summary* of points already noted by numerous strategic thinkers. See 
Jervis (1984), The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. And, Michael Mandelbaum (1981), The 
Nuclear Revolution. See, Bernard Brodie (1946), The Absolute Weapon. And, see, Robert Jervis 
(1988), "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons," International Securitv. vol 13.
Bernard L. Cohen, Nuclear Science and Society. New York: Anchor Books, 1970, p. 180.
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la b le  1. Casualties Produced by Conygntional, Chemical and Nuclear
Without Civil Defense With Civil Defense
Type Of
Warhead Dead Injured Dead Injured
Convention 5 13 2 6
high explosive
Chemical
(300 Kilograms of 200-3000 200-3000 20-300 20-300 
Sarin)
Nuclear (20 Kilotons) 40,000 40,000 20,000 20,000
Note: Targeted Against a Sparsely Populated Area.”
“  Bernard L. Cohen, Nuclear Science and Society. Anchor Books: New York. 1972., p. 178- 
85. The level of casualties quoted in Table 1. would increase dramatically if the same 20 kiloton 
weapon was dropped over a densely populated city, such as New York City, Cairo, or Tehran - 
producing upwards of 100 to 1,000 times more casualties than the same chemical weapon. If the 
number of casualties is still unimpressive, the yield of the atomic weapon is very small. The 
calamitous effects from a larçer weapon, in terms of kilotons or megatons, would increase 
exponentially with the size of the weapon.
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The destructive effects of the  atomic bomb, and the  lack of any intemational 
constraint aga inst its use , s te e rs  th e  NNW S-state to confront the  resounding 
strategic implications that follow from absolute nuclear asymmetry.”  W hat the stark 
ab sen ce  of a  nuclear w eapons implies for the  imperilled NNW S-state is th at it lacks 
th e  only "weapon ...[that can] keep  th e  nuclear peace ."”  Thus, the  NNW S-state 
confronts an inescapab le  dilem ma of security.
N uclear p e a c e  is predicated on th e  deterren t capability of th e  nuclear 
w eap o n .”  N uclear w eapons and  the  nuclear deterren t a re  the  only m eans an  
imperiled s ta te  can  acquire the  "desired foundation from which to ensure  ...security" 
in the nuclear a g e .”  Therefore, ac ts  of proliferation diffuse among th reatened  sta te s  
for the  sim ple reaso n  that no NNW S-state can d e ter without first removing itself 
from the position of nuclear w eakness.
" Ibid. p. 307.
John Meuller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the post-Cold 
World," ed. Sean M. Lynn Jones, Steven E. Miller, and Stephen Van Evera. in Nuclear Diplomacv 
aad-Cnsis.JVlana£gnimt. 1992. p. 29.
The point is that nuclear deterrence requires a sovereign nuclear weapons capability. A 
state can not even attempt to play the high cost deterrence game without first possessing a nuclear 
weapon or a nuclear w eapons-based security guarantee. As for the question of what constitutes a 
stable deterrent, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. In any case, future reference to an analogous 
nuclear weapons capability shall simply refer to a non-nuclear state that is seeking a sovereign 
nuclear weapons capability.
”  Holsti, op. cit.. p. 312.
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Chapter Three: Diffusion Theory
W hy a  NNW S-state would "go nuclear" h as  long b een  an  issu e  of scholarly 
d iscussion.”  Still, a  universally accep ted  explanation for proliferation h a s  remained 
elusive. P a s t studies, for exam ple, sug g ested  that, fear, d e te rrence , economics, 
and  s ta tu s , w ere  all critical factors in explaining an  ac t of horizontal nuclear 
w eapons proliferation.”
Am ong th e  proffered argum ents, the role of s ta tu s  se e m s  th e  most 
unconvincing. If nuclear w eapons w ere the determinant of m ajor power s ta tu s  one 
should have expected  every capab le  NNW S-state to have preferred proliferation 
over non-proliferation. Yet, a s  Kenneth Waltz correctly observed, "nuclear w eapons 
a lone do not m ake  s ta te s  into g rea t powers."”  Additionally, econom ic-based 
explanations fail to  explain why third world sta tes, like China, and  suspected  
program s in Pakistan, North Korea, Algeria, Iraq and Iran, utilized scarce  resources
For a review of numerous articles on various topics concerning nuclear weapons, please 
see: Fred Holroyd. ed- Thinking About Nuclear Weapons. Dover: Auburn House. 1985. p. 372-397.
■*’ Robert Strong, "The Nuclear Weapons States: Why They Went Nuclear," in Nuclear 
Ecoliferationjn the 198Q's. ed. William H. Kincade and Christopher Bertman. St Martin's Press: 
New York. 1982. p. 6.
”  Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of Intemational Politics," in International 
Securitv. Vol. 18 No. 2. Fall 1993. p. 52.
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to obtain nuclear w eapon  while also expanding their conventional military 
capabilities. Essentially, it se em s tenuous to a rg u e  that a  nation-state would 
undertake an  expensive  and capital-intensive en d eav o r for th e  sak e  of saving 
money in conventional military expenditures. Instead, th e  m ost likely explanation 
for proliferation is arguably  the  m ost obvious.
The act of horizontal proliferation is a  reaction to  the  insecurity experienced 
by a  NN W S-state w hen th rea tened  by a  NW S-state. T he reaction to  proliferate 
follows a s  a  th rea ten ed  NNW S-state s e e k s  to maintain and ensure  its own 
perception of relative national security. S ince only nuclear w eapons can keep the 
nuclear peace , proliferation is the  preferred action that will eschew  relative 
w eakness.
The security-im petus behind proliferation h as  b een  identified by previous 
scholars. Kenneth W altz , for exam ple, su g g ested  th a t a c ts  of proliferation a re  a 
desire by th e  NN W S-states for: (a) a counterweight; (b) to rem ove concern over the 
credibility of a  security guarantee; (c) to provide a  security um brella in the ab sen ce  
of one; and, (d) to  coun ter a  conventional im balance.”  In another piece. Waltz 
su g g ested  two core  rea so n s  for proliferation: (a) either b e c au se  of the  failings in 
extended d eterrence; or, (b) w hen o n e’s  adversary  obtains a  nuclear capability.®®
Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be better," in Nuclear 
Weapons Proliferation and Nuclear Risk, ed. James A. Shear. New York: St Martins Press, 1984. 
p. 78.
Kenneth N. Waltz, "What will the spread of nuclear weapons do to the world," in 
Intemational Political Effects of the Spread of nuclear Weapons, ed. John Cairo King. Washington:
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In accordance with W altz's suppositions, nuclear diffusion theory a sse rts  that the  
pursuit for relative national security can  account for horizontal nuclear w eapons 
proliferation.
The Theory of Nuclear Diffusion
Nuclear diffusion theory contends that the ac t of horizontal nuclear w eapons 
proliferation is the  product of exogenous factors directly related to  the  nuclear 
w eapons threat. T h e se  factors, if and  w hen they em erge, effectively alter the  
strategic context within which a  NNW S-state operates. B ecause the atomic w eapon 
is the quintessential existential threat, the  th rea tened  NNW S-state reacts with fear 
over a capability that it lacks. T he nature of the action and reaction betw een a  
th rea tened  NN W S-state and  a  threatening NW S-state produces an  identifiable 
dynamic to proliferation th a t nuclear diffusion theory s e e k s  to explain.
The dynamic intrinsic to horizontal proliferation is understood by focusing on 
the  term s of diffusion, infection, and emulation.®’ T h ese  term s mirror a  similar 
u sa g e  by Randolph Silverson and  Harvey S tarr in which they studied th e  sp read  
of war. In Diffusion of W ar. Silverson and Starr explained how w ars tended  to
Central intelligence Agency. 1979., p. 172-179.
“  Randolph M. Silverson and Harvey Starr The Diffusion of War: A Studv of Opportunity 
and Willingness. New York University Press: New York. 1991.
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s p read  horizontally in a  particular m anner. W hat th e  two authors su g g e st with 
respect to war patterns, however, also applies to an understanding of why NNWS- 
s ta te s  proliferate:
...the occurrence of so m e  event, war, for exam ple, provides a  s e t  of 
stimuli for emulation, or th e  occurrence of new  war participation by 
s ta te s  not originally a t war.®®
The critical assum ption of diffusion theory is th at the nuclear th reat inclines 
a  susceptib le NNW S-state to proliferate. A reaction of insecurity follows a s  a 
NN W S-state can not ignore the  unparalleled destructive implications associated  
with nuclear w eapons. As a result, the inclination to  proliferate diffuses aw ay from 
a n o th e r NW S-state and infects th o se  NN W S-states which a re  susceptible to the  
nuclear threat.
The logic to diffusion theory Is quite sim ple. The introduction of a  nuclear 
threat by a  nuclear arm ed-salient other is the critical "nuclear contagion" which can 
infect the susceptible and capable NNWS-state.®® Outright infection d epends on the 
d e g re e  of susceptibility th at a  NNW S-state experiences a t any given time. The 
deg ree  of susceptibility to the nuclear contagion is determined by: (a) the source of 
the  potential threat; (b) the perception of the  nuclear threat; (c) the  extent of regional
Silverson and Starr, op. cit.. p. 6.
The use of term contagion may seem odd, but I feel it firmly grasps the manner in which 
initial proliferation can infect, like a disease, the susceptible NNWS-state.
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or global instability; and , (d) w hether other a lternatives exist.
The chance for nuclear diffusion will vary according to the NNWS-state. Not 
all NNW S-states react with immediate and existential concern over a  nuclear arm ed 
salient other. For instance, C anada did not view a  nuclear-arm ed United S tates a s  
a  direct th rea t to its own national security. W hether C an ad a  would have reacted  
with fear d epended  on w hether relations betw een th e  two parties w ere filled with 
enmity a t the  time th at th e  United S ta te s  w ent nuclear. W hat nuclear diffusion 
a ssu m e s  is that susceptibility rem ain relative to a  NN W S-state's perception of its 
operating context:
Nations a re  only apprehensive abou t nuclear neighbors under 
particular conditions. It follows that alm ost every c a s e  of proliferation 
will vary with th e  specific security problem s faced  by the  nation 
seeking nuclear weapons.®'*
More specifically, according to nuclear diffusion, a  N N W S-state's operating 
milieu should be thought of a s  being perm issive and supportive of ac ts  of 
proliferation. Sufficient instability or insecurity, for exam ple, only se rves to heighten 
the degree of susceptibility to the  nuclear contagion. N evertheless, the milieu can 
still not determ ine w hether a  NNW S-state will diffuse.®® T he likelihood of 
su b seq u en t nuclear diffusion h inges on w hether th e  s ta te  with the  nuclear
®"* Strong, op. cit. p. 7. 
Bad. p. 132.
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capabilities is perceived a s  a  direct threat:
In an  a g e  of nuclear striking power, national security can  never be 
m ore relative: and to th e  extent th at it can  b e  a ssu re d  a t all, it m ust 
find its sanctions in th e  intentions of rival pow ers a s  well a s  in their 
capabilities.®®
To reiterate, w hat is m ost important to th e  dynam ic of diffusion is how 
susceptib le the  NN W S-state is to the  nuclear contagion.®® The th ree  options that 
m ay se rv e  to mitigate a  s ta te 's  susceptibility are: (a) rem aining vulnerable to the 
nuclear threat: (b) free-ride off th e  nuclear deterrent; and, (c) obtaining a  nuclear 
g u aran tee  from an o th er nuclear power - w hat is known a s  security through 
ex ten d ed  d e terrence. Should all three options prove inadequate  for the  NNWS- 
sta te , the  final recourse  m ust be to: (d) submit to infection by the  nuclear contagion.
The a ccep tan ce  of vulnerability could be considered  a s  a  viable strategic 
option for so m e NN W S-states. For example, a s ta te  m ay accep t vulnerability as 
it m ay lack the n ecessa ry  level of technological and /o r econom ic resources to 
acquire a  nuclear w eapons capability. A NNW S-state that is incapable of obtaining 
the  m ean s to rectify its insecurity is forced to accep t th e  profound connotations of 
absolute nuclear vulnerability. As could be expressed  in an  order of likelihood, that
Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era. Crane and Rusk Company: New York, 
1977., p. 21.
While this may somewhat question diffusion theory, it merely takes into account that states 
will not simply fall like dominoes after the initial act of proliferation.
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is from least likely to  m ost likely, the  following categorization grasps when a  NNWS- 
s ta te  m ay accep t vulnerability:
Diffusion and Degrees o f Vulnerability 
Least Likely To Accept Vulnerability
(a)T hreatened  and  Technologically Capable:
(b)Threatened, and  Possibly Technologically Capable;
Most likely To Accept Vulnerability
(a) Not T hreatened , but Technologically Capable;
(b) T hreatened , but Technologically Incapable;
(c)Not T hreatened , and  Technologically Incapable.
While not an  attractive option, th e  accep tan ce  of vulnerability could add to 
a  N N W S-state's perception of relative security. Specifically, by disregarding its 
desire  to  proliferate, it avo ids inciting or inviting th rea t from am ong o ther NNWS- 
s ta te s . For exam ple - an d  this is used  purely a s  an  analogy - if Mexico w as 
capable  of producing a  nuclear w eapon, its decision-m akers may calculate that only 
a  marginal gain would b e  achieved  by exploiting the  nuclear w eap o n s option; 
especially if Mexico lacked an  explicit nuclear threat. A declared Mexican nuclear 
w eap o n s capability would undoubtedly inflame Am erican security concerns and 
incite unneeded tensions am ong the two neighbors. A capable NN W S-state must, 
however, be expected to e sch ew  vulnerability if the  existence of the  s ta te  is in direct 
jeopardy. In this stra teg ic  c ircum stance, the cap ab le  NNW S-state can c h o o se  to:
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(b) free-ride; (c) ac ce p t an ex tended deterrent; or, (d) acquire an independent 
nuclear option.
The nuclear free-rider represents a  NNW S-state th a t obtains the benefits of 
nuclear deterrence through geographic proximity to a  nuclear-arm ed power. In this 
case , a  suscep tib le  NNW S-state d isregards the  inclination to proliferate by 
accepting a  d e  facto deterren t from a  neighboring NW S-state. The nuclear free­
rider, however, accep ts  this deterrence without declared com m itm ent by the  NWS- 
state to its national security.
T he viability of th e  free-rider option is th at cap ab le  nations could calculate 
that an  independent nuclear arsenal is unnecessary  considering its spatial proximity 
to what a re  already friendly nuclear-armed powers. In o ther words, an independent 
nuclear w eapons capability has less strategic value for th e  NNW S-state if its primary 
nuclear threat is sufficiently deterred  by a  neighboring NW S-state. Still, the  
strategic value of th e  free-rider position declines a s  th e  explicitness of the nuclear 
th reat in creases  ag a in st the NNW S-state. In this stra teg ic  circum stance, th e  
NNW S-state m ust prefer a  nuclear deterrent to the free-rider position. The NNWS- 
s tate that desires a  deterren t m ust accep t e ither type II (ex tended deterrent), or a  
type I nuclear d e te rren ce  (independent nuclear deterrent).
In ex tended  d e terrence the  NW S-state ex p an d s th e  sco p e  of the  a rea  
deterred to include an  ally which is a  NNW S-state. T he problem  is that the  notion 
of ex tended d e te rren ce  departs  fundamentally from th e  traditional logic of 
deterrence a s  "in order to deter it is necessary  to  have th e  m ea n s  of implementing
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that threat."®® U nder extended deterrence, it is a  distant NW S-state that p o s s e s s e s  
the nuclear m ean s with which to deter nuclear aggression . As such, the threatened  
NNW S-state m ust rely on another to mitigate the  nuclear threat.
The va lue  of type II deterrence is often deem ed  su sp ec t since it d ep en d s 
entirely upon th e  credibility and the  willingness of th e  nuclear guarantor. If the  
ex tended de terren t is viewed a s  strategically inadequate, the  only recourse open  
to the NNW S-state is that it acquire a  sovereign nuclear w eapons capability (or type 
I deterrence). If a  NNW S-state does decide to go nuclear, and  if  this decision is in 
reaction to a direct threat posed by a NWS-state, then, the  intrinsic nature to horizontal 
proliferation is o n e  of nuclear diffusion.
The Logic of Diffusion Theory
The desire  of a NNW S-state to maintain relative security within an anarchic 
nuclear-arm ed milieu underlines the p henom ena  of nuclear diffusion. Since 
existential security is threatened  by a nuclear arm ed-salient other, the NNW S-state 
is susceptible to infection by the  nuclear contagion. If th e  susceptible NNW S-state 
succum bs to infection, the  end  consequence  is that it em ula tes the only essentia l 
capability that can  en su re  relative security - the  nuclear m eans. The logic of the 
nuclear diffusion dynam ic involves the following p rocess:
IbiiL
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Figure 1; The Loge of the Diffusion Dynamic
Initial External Stimulus 
(The Perceived Nuclear Threat)
+
Vulnerable Security Context
(The P resence  of Susceptibility Combined with the Lack of Mitigation)
= Susceptibility to the Nuclear Contagion.
Susceptibility to the Nuclear Contagion
Emulation-Réaction 
(The Act of Proliferating)
= DIFFUSION 
A Subsequent Act of Horizontal Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation
The premise that underlies the  nuclear diffusion dynamic is the  assum ption 
th a t NNW S-states are  especially  sensitive to the  nuclear w eapons threat. As a 
result, the  imperiled NN W S-state c h o o ses  to proliferate since nuclear weapons and 
only nuclear weapons ensure the nuclear peace with a nuclear-armed adversary. The 
following structured explanation p resen ts  how th e  dynam ic of nuclear diffusion 
would operate  betw een a  N W S-state and  a  NNW S-state:
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TJie-Pynamic of Diffusion
The operating environment is perceived a s  filled with security threats;
S ta te  A introduces a  nuclear w eap o n s capability into the operating 
environm ent of S tate B;
S ta te  B is vulnerable and perce ives a  th reat from s ta te  A's 
capabilities;
Depending on the given deg ree  of susceptibility, infection by the 
nuclear contagion b eco m es possible.
S ta te  B h as  th e  option of reactions th a t could mitigate the possibility 
of diffusion, however;
If S ta te  B lacks in valid options, o ne  co u rse  of action is to  em ulate 
S ta te  A's nuclear w eapons capabilities;
If S ta te  B d o e s  emulate, diffusion h a s  occurred.
The following chapter now tes ts  the  validity of the  theory by comparing the 
first p h ase  of horizontal proliferation with the previous assum ptions m ade by nuclear 
diffusion.^®
Please Note: The reference to a first-phase of proliferation is regards to the phase of 
proliferation that includes only the first five proliférants. The reason these five are distinguished is 
that all five comprise the overt nuclear club that began with the United States in 1945, and ended 
with China in 1964.
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Chapter Four; A Test of Diffusion Theory
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 offers th e  following 
definition for w hat constitutes a  NW S-state:
For the  purposes of this treaty, a  nuclear-w eapons s ta te  is one which 
h as  m anufactured and exploded a  nuclear w eapon or o ther nuclear 
explosive device
B ased  on the  strict NPT definition, only five proliférants, all from the first 
ph ase  of horizontal proliferation, a re  recognized. The five NW S-states include: the 
United S tates; France; G reat Britain; China; and  the  former Soviet Union.^ The first 
p h ase  of proliferation is distinguished from su b seq u en t p h a ses  by the presence of 
overt declarations. In declaring their nuclear capabilities, th e s e  five s ta te s  m ade it 
c lear to o thers th a t they did p o ssess  the m ean s  to keep th e  nuclear peace . The
' Coit D. Blacker, and Gloria Duffy, International Arms Control: Issues andj^greements. 
Stanford University Press: Stanford. 1984. p. 396.
' The Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are excluded in that these states are not 
proliférants. Rather, they are de facto nuclear weapons states because of the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union. In addition, Belarus has since repudiated its nuclear weapons capabilities, and 
Kazakhstan and the Ukraine are in the process of doing so. India is questionably left out of the club 
in that its 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion" did not lead to an end of its opaque status. South Africa 
is also absent for the simple reason that did not declare its status during this first phase.
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question  which m ust be answ ered  is why did th ese  five s ta tes  pursue  nuclear 
w eapons.
First Phase Analysis
T he im petus for the  American nuclear w eapons program cam e during the  
S econd  World War. Under th e  obviously stark  anarchic  conditions of global war, 
sensitivity towards an adversary’s  capabilities w ere  understandably high. In o ther 
words, th e  Second World W ar m ade the  Am erican operating environm ent 
susceptib le  to infection by a  nuclear contagion. The perception of a  G erm any 
believed to be  rushing to develop an  atom ic device represents the  first nuclear 
contagion that would subsequently  instigate the  American atom ic w eapons 
program:^
. ..Fascist G erm any had devoted little attention and alm ost no 
reso u rces  to a atomic bomb. Yet, on the  b asis  of its contribution to 
th e  solution of the  fission problem s, th e  knowledge of its advanced  
weaponry, and the quality of Germ any's technical and industrial base, 
the assum ption that a  high-level atomic weapon effort was under way 
w as plausible.”
 ̂ See: Ashok Kapur, International Nuclear Proliferation. Praeger Publishers: New York. 
1979. See also. William H. Kincade, "The United States: nuclear decision-making, 1939-89," in 
Security with Nuclear Weapons, ed. Regina Cowcn Karp. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 1991.
’ Kincaid, op. cit. p. 24.
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The reaso n s why the  United S ta te s  began its atom ic w eap o n s  program  a re  
historically well-established. S cholar Ashok Kapur, for instance, concluded that 
"the United S ta te s  m ade the  bomb before the  G erm ans did and th e  initial decision 
w as geared  to  perceptions about the  implications of G erm an atom ic arms."^ Thus, 
the  dynam ic of nuclear diffusion se e m s  to explain the  first act of proliferation.
The first instance of proliferation w as an exam ple of nuclear diffusion since 
the  A m erican program  sought to em ulate  a  suspec ted  Germ an atom ic w eapons 
program. Diffusion followed since the United S ta te s  also lacked any other 
accep tab le  recourse . Specifically, is it reasonable  to  a rgue th a t th e  U.S. could 
have accep ted  vulnerability? Aside from such a contention, th ere  w as no viable 
alternative to emulation. Neither free-loading or extended de te rrence  w ere options 
to be considered. Instead, the United S ta te s  em ulated the essen tia l m ean s which 
it perceived a s  n ecessa ry  for relative security.
In becoming the  first acknowledged nuclear w eapons state, th e  United S tates 
alters the basis by which other NNW S-states would calculate their national security. 
In fact, American nuclear em ulation has consistently influenced th e  behavior of 
num erous N N W S-states: not excluding the  former Soviet Union.
The primary impetus for the  Soviet atomic w eapons program w as a  perceived 
gap in nuclear capabilities held by its primary salient others.® In all, th ree stimuli
Kapur, O P. cit. p. 54.
D zid .
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could explain subseq u en t Soviet emulation. According to historical record, a  "pilot 
nuclear weapon research  program  had been  started in 1942 ... in light of 
intelligence about the  British. U.S. and G erm an work in th e  field."’’ N evertheless, 
it w as th e  sp eed  with which the  United S ta te s  developed and utilized th e  atomic 
bomb against Jap an  which h asten ed  Soviet reactions and eventual emulation:®
"...som e R ussian  pessim ists  ...dismally rem arked that R u ssia 's  
desperately hard victory over Germ any was now as  good a s  wasted."®
Further insight into Soviet perceptions is offered by Jo sep h  Stalin himself who 
expressed  the g rea te st alarm  over this new and exploitable A m erican capability:
"A single dem and of you, com rades. Provide us  with atomic w eapons 
in the shortest possible tim e ... The balance has b een  destroyed . 
Provide th e  Bomb - it will rem ove g reat danger from us."^°
Evidently, the  Soviet Union proliferated so  a s  to  rem ove an undeniable gap  
in relative security brought on by a  new and m ost powerful capability p o ssesse d  by 
its primary salient other; which w as the United States. Given th e  em erging nature 
of the  Cold War, Soviet susceptibility to  the  nuclear contagion w as of significant
Allen Lynch, "The Soviet Union: nuclear weapons and their role in security policy," in 
Security with Nuclear Weapons? ed. Regina Cowen Karp. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 1991. 
p. 107.
® David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. Yale University Press: New Haven. 
1983. p. 18.
- Alexander Werth, Russia at War: I94W 5. Pan Books Ltd: London. 1965, p. 925. 
Lynch, on. cit.. p. 107.
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d e g re e  to permit infection. Specifically, the  United sta te s  w as perceived a s  
representing a  direct nuclear threat, and "the gravity and urgency of this perceived 
threat" sh ap ed  strategic concerns and successfully  influenced Soviet em ulation.”  
The Soviet Union would openly actualize its nuclear w eapons capability in a 
dram atic tes t in 1949.
The United Kingdom, the third m em ber of the  nuclear club, began  its atom ic 
w eapons program in 1947. Britain's initial atomic preoccupation began during VWVII 
but w as  quickly overtaken by American research  since dom estic resources were 
directed  tow ards the w ar effort. T he British were able to obtain so m e  technical 
atom ic experience from th e  U.S. with the  1943 Q uebec atom ic collaboration 
agreem ent.''^
At th e  end of WWII, Britain's d esires for increased atom ic w eapons 
a s s is ta n c e  and cooperation quickly evaporated  with the 1946 p a ssa g e  of the 
Am erican McIVlahon act which prohibited all "cooperation with any foreign powers 
on nuclear weapon" m atters.’® This recalcitrance by the U.S. created a  d eep  fissure 
betw een the  two allies, a n d  ad d ed  significantly to British susceptibility; especially 
in light of the  Soviet atom ic and conventional threat to Europe
T he effect that both the  explicit th reat from the Soviet Union and  the lack of
“  Lj-nch, Q P,_cit. p. 107.
-- David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear JHlemmas. The Brookings Institution: Washington. 
1983. p. 27.
mid. p. 27.
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confidence in the  Am erican security gu aran tee  had on British susceptibility can  not 
be ignored. For exam ple. Sir John A nderson, o n e  of Churchill's chief a id es  in 
nuclear w eapons m atters, cited the "obsession with the  growing might of the  Soviet 
Union and  th e  d an g ers  this held for Britain's post-war position, especially given the 
uncertainties of postw ar U.S. behavior."”  Proliferation specialist Peter C lausen  also 
cites American recalcitrance a s  a c lear "betrayal o f U.S. com m itm ents and a  blow 
to British post-war designs."’® In comparison, au thors Stuart Croft and Phil Williams 
sug g est that the  1947 British decision to proliferate is explained by drawing on the  
four underlying beliefs driving British security policy:
A concern  over th e  anarchic system ;... a  hostile Soviet Union; the  
desire  for influence with the United S ta tes; and a  belief in the  
stabilizing effect of nuclear de te rren ce ...’®
Nuclear diffusion occurred in the  c a se  of Britain since the  a sse ssm e n t of the 
Soviet atom ic threat, coupled with the  implications of a reluctant American ally, 
fostered the d egree of susceptibility that w as required for successful infection by the 
nuclear contagion.”  The lack of mitigating options ensured  infection a s  it w as  clear
” Schwartz, op. cit.. p. 28. 
Clausen, op. cit.. p. 19. 
Ibidx
mid. p. 18.
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th a t Britain would not have  accep ted  vulnerability, freeloading, and  ch o se  not to 
accep t th e  Am erican g u a ra n te e .’® The research  and  developm ent into an  atomic 
device culm inates with Britain's first atom ic te s t in O ctober of 1952.’®
F rance followed Britain a s  th e  fourth m em ber of th e  overt nuclear w eapons 
club. After the Second  World War, through 1945 to 1954, F rance 's atomic program 
w as initially focused on developing civilian, rather than  military, applications.®® The 
re-direction of the  F rench atom ic program  began in th e  fifth republic. For France, 
both security co n cern s  and a  desire  to reasse rt "national in dependence  and 
maximum world status,"®’ a p p e a r  to  explain the  redirection in th e  atom ic program.
In th e  1954 and  1956 period, internal d e b a te s  w ere m arked by divisions 
betw een th o se  which believed in the  utility of a French nuclear w eapons capability, 
and  th o se  that considered  an  independent deterren t a s  weakening th e  security 
relationship with NATO, complicated F rance 's  pursuit of an  independent nuclear
We must keep in mind the period in which Britain pursues the nuclear option. This is just 
after a costly war in which Britain suffered significantly. After the end of World War II there emerges 
a new European threat, the Soviet Union. The Soviet's were perceived as hostile and expansionist, and 
when they became nuclear armed it seems implausible to even suggest that Britain could have accepted 
vulnerability as an option; especially in light of American unwillingness in the nuclear matters.
The Nuclear Notebook. Arms Control Today. May 1991.
Schwartz, on. cit. p. 36. See also: LawTcnce Scheiman, Atomic Energy Policy in France 
under the Fourth Republic. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 1965.
Klaus Schubert, "France," in Security with Nuclear Weapons? ed. Regina Cowen Karp. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 1991. p. 162.
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w eapons option.®® The p roponen ts in th e  military and  political a ren a  s tre sse d  that 
an  American ex tended  d e te rren t w as of little value given th e  stra teg ic  reality 
confronted by th e  United S ta tes. As G eneral Pierre Gallois, a  vociferous supporter 
of the  force de frappe, would explain, it w as the  reality of a  Soviet retaliatory nuclear 
strike that m ade th e  value of th e  Am erican ex tended  deterren t so  suspect:
'T hreatened  with enorm ous d am ag es ...America might hesitate. And 
once the likelihood of A m erican intervention w as in doubt, the  
U.S.S.R. would recover a  sh a re  of its freedom  of action..."®®
The external stim ulus for French em ulation w as  a  mix of security concerns 
which w ere all underscored  by th e  fear th at "the superpow ers would be willing to 
limit a  nuclear w ar within the  European theater."®” O ther noted references to  French 
national security would cite th e  possibility of a  resu rgen t Germ any. Specifically, 
French Chief of Staff C harles Ailleret wrote that in th e  1950's he  supported the 
nuclear w eapons capability a s  "a g u a ran tee  against the  repetition of German 
intrusions of 1914 and 1940."®® Notwithstanding, the m ost credible stimuli that can 
explain French em ulation in 1960 w as a  desire  to  obtain a  sovereign nuclear
George A. Kelly, "The Political Background of the French A-Bomb," Orbis, vol. 4. Fall
I960.
Pierre M. Gallois, The Balance of Terror; Strategy for the Nuclear Age. Houghton 
Mifflin: Boston. 1961. p. 1 3 9 ^ .
Schubert, on. cit.. p. 173.
=® Ibid- p. 172.
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w eap o n s  capability in light of th e  Soviet atom ic th rea t and a  w eak American 
extended deterrent.®® Quite simply, the  desire  to improve relative security drove this 
instance of horizontal proliferation a s  "a F rance a rm ed with nuclear w eapons would 
be ab le  to free  itself from its fears and once again take its destiny into her hands."®’ 
Following France, China is the  last m em ber to en te r  th e  nuclear w eapons club.
According to  historical records. C hinese proliferation resulted in resp o n se  to 
th e  lack of confidence over Soviet security guaran tees. T he inclination to proliferate 
is furthered by China's desire  to obtain th e  essentia l m eans that would en su re  future 
national security in relation to all th rea ts  posed  by its salient others.®® Historically, 
C hina's p ast experience with invasions and  occupations by forces from th e  W est 
and Asia had already aggravated  susceptibility even  prior to the  formal introduction 
of the  nuclear contagion.®® The susceptibility to the  nuclear contagion would follow 
during the  early y ea rs  of the  Cold W ar.
In 1950, a  Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual A ssistance, 
w as su p p o sed  to have united Chinese security with the  Soviet Union.®® T he lack of
Nuclear Factbook, "Nuclear Pursuits," Arms Control Today. May 1991. p. 49.
Klaus Schubert, "France," Security With Nuclear weapons, ed. Regina Cowen Karp, 
oxford: Oxford University Press. 1991. p. 234.
Gerald Segal, "China," in Security with Nuclear Weapons? ed. Regina Cowen Karp. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 1991. p. 127.
William Tow, Encountering the Dominant Plaver. Columbia University Press: Oxford. 
1991. p. 207.
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S oviet action during th e  Korean W ar and the first Taiwan crisis only served  to 
a ccen tu a te  C hinese fears and insecurities. The annulm ent of an  additional 
ag reem ent that w as to  have provided a  sovereign atomic device  solidified C hina's 
perception  th a t th e  Soviet Union w as unreliable a s  an  ally. Most dam aging, 
however, w as Soviet equivocation during the Korean W ar and  th e  Quem oy/M atsu 
Taiwan islands crisis of 1954-55. In both cases , the  Soviet Union ignored th a t the  
United S ta te s  m ad e  implicit th rea ts  of atomic attack ag a in st China.®’ China's 
decision to em bark on an  independent atomic w eap o n s program  is finally taken  in 
a  1955 politburo meeting.®®
In th e  c a se  of th e  last m em ber of the nuclear club, C hina's successfu l 
infection by th e  nuclear contagion w as probable since all mitigating alternatives 
w ere  strategically inadequate. The option of vulnerability, for instance, w as 
unsuitable for China since  Mao s tre sse d  the need to consolidate national d efen se  
in order to en su re  that no imperialist power would invade China again.®® The option 
of freeloading and  ex tended  deterrence  w ere d isregarded s in ce  China viewed the
See, Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomac} During the Korean War," in Nuclear Diplomacy 
and Crisis Management, ed. Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, and Stephen Van Evera. The 
MIT Press: Cambridge. 1990. See also, Gordon H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, 
Dulles, and the Qucmoy-Matsu Crisis," in Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management, ed. Sean M. 
Lvim-Jones, Steven E. Miller, and Stephen Van Evera. The MIT Press: Cambridge. 1990. And, H. 
W. Brands, Jr., "Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan 
Crisis," in Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management, ed. Sean M. Lynn^ones, Steven E. MiUer, 
and Stephen Van Evera. The MIT Press: Cambridge. 1990.
Tow, op. cit. p. 210. 
Pollack, op. cit.. p.44.
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Soviets a s  a  reluctant ally. C onsequently, the  only recourse  o p en  for China was 
to em ulate  the essen tia l capability p o ssesse d  by China's nuclear-arm ed salient 
others. The Lop Nor atomic tes t openly declares China's atomic capability in 1964.
Not surprisingly, China's decision to emulate is similar to the  decisions taken 
by both France and G reat Britain. In each  c a se  examined, the  NNW S-state sought 
to d etach  itself from an unreliable nuclear guarantor and to d e te r  an  external 
nuclear threat. In response, e a ch  of th ese  three s ta te s  obtained  w hat was 
considered an essentia l capability for maintaining relative security.®” Thus, entrance 
into th e  overt nuclear club follows a  similar pattern for all five proliférants a s  each  
form er NNW S-state becom es a  NW S-state only in reaction to th e  nuclear threat 
posed  by a  nuclear a rm ed-salient other.
Post-Tggt Analysis
The theory of nuclear diffusion attem pted to explain the schem atic  pattem  to 
first p h ase  horizontal proliferation. W hat diffusion theory shows is that subsequen t 
ac ts  of horizontal proliferation occurred am ong susceptib le  and  cap ab le  salient 
others. Furthermore, by examining the  historical evidence, the  critical contentions
Martin Van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict. New York: St 
Martin's Pres, 1993. p. 72.
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m ade by nuclear diffusion theory seem  consisten t with th e  empirical evidence.®®
In ea ch  instance of first p h a se  proliferation a  threatening nuclear-arm ed 
salient other w as perceived within a  NNW S-state's milieu. This exogenous nuclear 
threat, which w as coupled with a  lack of options th a t could have mitigated the 
nuclear threat, fostered grea te r susceptibility and inclined five NN W S-states to 
subsequen tly  diffuse. In fact, not in any of the  five c a s e s  exam ined did a  NNWS- 
sta te  proliferate in the a b sen ce  of a real or perceived nuclear threat. Still, stronger 
generalizations m ay have to b e  tem pered  since not every potential first p hase  NWS- 
s ta te  ch o se  to proliferate.
The pattem  to first p h ase  diffusion did not consist of direct nuclear diffusion 
from NNW S-state A to  NNW S-state B and then to NN W S-state C. The pattern a s  
it actually developed w as limited to a num ber of capab le  and  willing salient others. 
There w as direct diffusion, for exam ple, betw een the initial perception of a  German 
atom ic w eapons program  and the  su b seq u en t Am erican and  R ussian program s. 
In addition, the  American and R ussian  program s w ere integral in encouraging the  
British, French, and  C hinese, decisions to proliferate. The question  that rem ains 
unansw ered is why would only five capab le  s ta te s  proliferate during the entire first 
p h a se?
A definitive answ er to why so m e NN W S-states did not "go nuclear" is
It befalls upon me to first qualify my conclusions. Clearly, further historical or formal 
evidence would strengthen the explanatory value of diffusion theory. Unfortunately, that is an exercise 
that can only follow after this current piece.
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lacking. The m ost obvious additional first p h a se  proliférants would h av e  included 
C anada. Sw eden, W est Germ any, and  Japan.®® S w eden  and C a n a d a  did deb a te  
w hether they  should go  nuclear. In both ca se s , ea ch  sta te  decided  that an 
indigenous nuclear option would offer only a  slight gain for relative security.®’ For 
W est G erm any and Ja p an , the  A m erican security guaran tee , and  a  recen t history 
of aggression , seem  to explain why neither s ta te  could have openly pursued  the  
nuclear w eapons option.®® Therefore, the  five NN W S-states that did diffuse seem  
to have b een  the m ost likely, or susceptible, of all th e  candidates.®®
In conclusion, b ased  on the analysis of the  previous test, it a p p e a rs  that the  
theory of nuclear diffusion theory offers a  useful paradigm from which to  understand 
the phenom ena of horizontal proliferation. More importantly, the theory em phasized  
how nuclear threat and  susceptibility ac t symbiotically to prom ote su b seq u en t 
proliferation within the  first phase. The relevance of the  nuclear diffusion paradigm  
for second  ph ase  horizontal proliferation, however, h a s  yet to be explored. In order 
to  utilize th e  diffusion model for second  p h a se  analysis, the critical distinctions 
betw een th e  first and  seco n d  p h a se  of proliferation m ust now be e s tab lished .
Japan's nuclear position wiU be explained in the second part of thesis, which includes an 
analysis of Japan's supposed basis for its nuclear inhibitions.
John Young, "The Contemporary Defense Debate in Canada," in The U.S.-Canada 
Security Relationship; The Politics. Strategy, and Technology of Defense, ed. David G. Haglund, and 
Joel S. Sokolsky. Westview Press: Boulder. 1989. p.41-64.
Schwartz, op, cit. p.41-45.
Clearly, this conclusion is a tautological one. Unfortunately, I am unclear as to how to 
escape such a natured conclusion.
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ChafitenJFive: The Second Phase o[ Proliferation
It is the  a b sen c e  of atom ic w eapons tests, and  o ther form s of overt 
declaration, that clearly distinguishes the  first from the seco n d  p h a s e  of 
horizontal nuclear w eap o n s proliferation.’ The existence of a nonproliferation 
regim e explains th e  prolonged a b sen c e  in overt a c ts  of horizontal proliferation 
betw een  1964 and 1995. W hat th e  nonproliferation regim e es tab lished  w as an 
international norm of nonproliferation b ased  on a se t  of rules and  p rocedures 
which sough t to stym ie overt proliferation. Given th a t no sta te  h as  y e t to  declare 
its nuclear capabilities, the  regim e w as successful in modifying, constraining, and 
structuring, the  m ore overt behavior of N NW S-states.
T he com ponents of th e  NPT regim e include various arm s control and 
arm s limitation ag reem ents;
The Nonproliferation Regime
1957 - C reation of Intem ational Atomic Energy A ssociation 
1962 - The Limited T est Ban Treaty 
1970 - Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
1978- Nuclear Suppliers Group
- The lone exception being South Africa which declared and then rescinded it nuclear 
weapons capabilitv .
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The centerp iece of th e  regim e is the  1970 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 
W hat the  NPT treaty es tab lish ed  w as a  disparity in the  num ber of overt or 
declared  nuclear w eapon  s ta te s . The d esire  to keep th e  nuclear club to five 
N W S-states led the United S ta tes, and others, to en co u rag e  th e  ratification of 
th e  1970 NPT treaty by all known NNW S-states. In exch an g e  for NPT 
ratification, signatories th a t w ere NN W S-states w ere prom ised: (a) "a ssis tan ce  in 
th e  developm ent of peacefu l u se s  of nuclear energy" (Article IV): and , (b) "a 
requirem ent of the  nuclear w eap o n s s ta te s  to take s te p s  toward disarm am ent" 
(Article VI).® A bsent from th e  ten e ts  of th e  treaty, however, w as any  reference to 
th e  relationship betw een national security and horizontal proliferation.
The relationship betw een a  NNW S-state's non-nuclear s ta tu s  and  national 
security w as first referenced  in a  1968 U N. security resolution. The 1968 
resolution conjoined NPT ratification with a  UN Security Council resolution to 
com e to the "assistance  of any non-nuclear w eapons parties th at w ere  victims of 
aggression  with nuclear weapons."® Yet, the  resolution lacked any  formal 
commitment by a nuclear-arm ed s ta te  to de te r  acts of nuclear ag g ress io n . As 
such , the 1968 UN resolution failed to  red ress  the critical relationship betw een 
nuclear th reat and  su b seq u e n t a c ts  of proliferation.
- Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The Logic of Inequality," Foreign Policv 1984. p. 125.
 ̂ Ben Sanders, "Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Broken Record?" ] 
Scientists. July/August 1990, p. 17-18.
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The N P Ts primary goal h as  b een  to  facilitate technical denial by forcing 
all non-nuclear s ignatories to ac ce p t inspections of all civilian-related nuclear 
facilities. The intent of inspections, conducted  through the  Intem ational Atomic 
Energy Association (IAEA), w as  to inhibit diversion and/or acquisition of 
w eapons-grade fissile m aterial and all o ther e lem ents that com prise a  nuclear 
device. But by seeking only technical denial, Article IV of the  NPT treaty 
granted each  signatory the  right to develop and/or acquire peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. As a  result, th e  NPT effectively licensed th e  global dissem ination 
of civilian nuclear technology which h as  thereby provided certain NN W S-states 
with the  so-called latent nuclear weapons option:
The proliferation of m ea n s  has g one  beyond early expectations, 
especially b e c au se  of th e  dissem ination of nuclear power plants 
from which fissionable m aterials can  under som e circum stances 
be  easily filched.”
The notion of a  latent nuclear w eapons option centers on the  distinction 
betw een civilian and military u se s  of nuclear power. The distinction is 
complicated since "the civilian nuclear fuel cycle can be used  to g en e ra te  special 
nuclear materials usable  in explosives."® T he latent option, and thus th e  opaque
' Brodie, op, cit. p. 384.
® Kathleen Bailey, Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation San Francisco: Westview 
, 1993, p. 4.
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nuclear weapon sta tus, is b est described  by the following four com ponents:
(See: Table 2.):®
Table 2. Pgtgrminants of Opa<meZLateiit Status
1. An A bsence of T ests  a s  an  Overt Indicator o f Proliferation.
2. Denial of P ossess io n .
3. Lack of a  Doctrine Concerning Use.
4. P ossession  of the  N ecessary  M eans Required fo ra  Nuclear W eapons
Capability.
A confirmed latent s ta tu s  is achieved o nce  a  NNW S-state obtains the 
indigenous capability to m anufacture a  nuclear w eapon. A NNW S-state is only 
considered nuclear w eapons capab le  if it h as  th e  necessary  level of technical 
sophistication for th e  nuclear w eapons-m aking option. The latent w eapons 
option, however, is well within th e  g rasp  of som e NN W S-states b ecau se  civilian 
nuclear capabilities can  be utilized for w eapons purposes.
" The elements which have helped define opaque status are extrapolated from observations 
made by these authors: See: Avner Cohen and Benjamin Franklin," Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 
In Opaque Nuclear Proliferation New York: Frank Cass and Company, 1991, p. 20.
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Civilian Nuclear Power or Military Capability
T here a re  two diam etric p u rposes derived from a civilian nuclear power 
program . T he two pu rp o ses  a re  military and civilian. T h e se  p u rp o ses  can not be 
circum scribed a s  a  civilian pow er program will provide an  ad d ed  military 
capability. M oreover, no civilian nuclear program  can  b e  structured  that rem oves 
all possib le military applications. Essentially, th e  structure  of the  civilian-related 
nuclear power o r research  program  may only com plicate an d  prolong the  path 
tow ards the  nuclear w eapons option. As a  result, a t a  certain  level in th e  civilian 
program , th e  NN W S-state will b e  ab le  to exploit a  latent w eap o n s  option from its 
"civilian" capabilities.
The exact relationship betw een a civilian nuclear pow er program  and th e  
acquisition of a  n uclear w eapons option is quite simple. T he  NN W S-state gains 
a m ore readily exploitable nuclear w eapons option a s  it ach iev es  a specific level 
in civilian nuclear capabilities. T he actual path  tow ards th e  latent nuclear 
w eap o n s option is described  a s  a  phasal one. Specifically, each  successive  
s tep  in a  civilian program  provides a  NNW S-state with improved w eapons- 
making potential.’ Beyond a  certain  level, for exam ple, a  civilian program  
perm its th e  NN W S-state to "acquire the fundam ental capability to produce
' Ashok Kapur, International Nuclear Proliferation. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1979.,
p. 55.
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nuclear w eapons... by... unintended consequence."® Dual-use, therefore, allows 
a  declared  NN W S-state to  gain the essen tia l m ean s to go nuclear without having 
to jeopard ize non-nuclear sta tus.
Pual-Use and the Nuclear Capability
The strategic implications of dual-use  su g g ests  that "if a sta te  considered 
it of u tm ost importance to  a ssu re  its neighbor that no nuclear w eapons program  
w as at hand ... there  might be no o ther way to achieve this but avoid all 
investm ent in nuclear power production."® The concern over civilian nuclear 
capabilities is a  valid o n e ,’° and  recognizing the  relationship helps avoid the 
incorrect tendency of p as t proliferation analysis "to su p p o se  that a tom s for peace  
and atom s for w ar are  two distinct realm s."”  More importantly, analysis of 
second  p h ase  nuclear diffusion requires a  realization "that by developing atomic
® Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. Chicago; The University of 
Chicago Press. 1991, p. 5.
® George Quester, "Conceptions of Nuclear Threshold States," Security with Nuclear 
Weapons, ed. R^ina Cowen Karp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990., p. 215.
Past proliferation analysis has had the tendency to attribute greater capabilities to 
countries perceived as interested in nuclear weapons without evaluating the likelihood of this 
recourse. If current second phase analysis is to be more effective it must limit the sample of would-be 
diffusers to those states which are indeed the most capable, rather than those which are simply most 
willing.
-- William Van Cleave, "Nuclear Technology and Weapons," Nuclear Proliferation Phase 
II. ed. Robert M. Lawrence, and Joel Lawrus. Kansas: Allen Press Inc. 1974,, p. 33.
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energy  for peaceful u se  ... th e  nuclear option" can  be reach ed .”  At w hat level 
this nuclear option is reached  d e p e n d s  on w hether the  NN W S-state h as  
obtained the n ecessary  com ponen ts integral to th e  construction of an  atomic 
device.
The Components
The primary technical obstac le  that confronts a would-be proliférant, 
"despite the difficulties in nuclear w eap o n s design and fabrication," is the 
acquisition of "fissile m aterials in su itable am ounts and of suitable quality."”  This 
a sp ec t of the  w eapons program  is "the single m ost costly and difficult step in the 
process,"”  and is "the central problem  facing a nation seeking  the  bomb."”
Final developm ent of th e  atom ic device would still require, however, "a super 
critical m ass" com prised of th e se  additional com ponen ts:”
" Ibid. p. 33.
”  Gilinsky, op. cit.. p. 14.
”  Bailey, op. cit.. p. 12.
”  John M. Deutch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs Fall 1992., p. 121. 
Bamarbv. op. cit... p. 4.
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Thg Atomic Bomb's Components
(a) Highly Enriched Uranium Ur 235 or Plutonium Pu 239 
with less than  10% Pu 2 4 0 .”
(b) A sphere  of m ass.
(c) A high density in m ass  in order to reduce th e  num ber of 
escaping  neutrons.
(d) Purity of th e  fissile material: Ur 235 to 90%  Pu 239 with less than 
10% Pu 240.
(e) A surrounding tam per material.
Among the  atom ic bom b’s  ingredients, it is again  th e  availability of the  
fissile material, either U 235 or Pu 239, which is th e  essen tia l com ponent and 
primary determ inant of latent sta tus. For exam ple, a  "uranium-fuelled power 
reactor operating to p ioduce  electricity" provides a  NNW S-state with th e  fissile 
material th at facilitates th e  latent nuclear w eapons option.”  Yet, th e  e a s e  with 
which the  NNW S-state acquires the  necessary  w eapons-g rade  fissile m aterial 
d ep en d s on the type of reactor that the NN W S-state h a s  a t its disposal.
Of th e  types of civilian reactors, the  Light-W ater re a c to r  (LWR) is the
One should note that unprocessed Pu-240 could also be utilized but is more unstable. Use 
of such a substance would require a very fast implosion techniques to prevent pre-detonation. 
"Further improvement in the explosive >ield from a nuclear bomb could be obtained by surrounding 
the lithium hydride with uranium. The neutrons emitted in the d-t reaction come with high energy 
and high energy neutrons that can cause fission reactions in U238 as easily as in U235. " See: Bernard 
L. Cohen, Nuclear Science and Society. Anchor Books: New York. 1974. p. 171.
Van Cleave, op. cit.. p. 36.
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m ost difficult from which to  obtain w eapons-grade plutonium .”  In contrast, the 
Natural Uranium-fuelled Graphite reactor (GCR) and  Heavy-Water Moderated 
reactor (HWR) a re  considered  optimal plutonium producers.®® For exam ple, in 
only a  year a  natural uranium -fueled reactor with e a ch  gram  of U 235 consum ed 
produces .85 gram s of w eapons-g rade  plutonium.®’ As a  result, a  "30 MWth G as 
Cooled R eactor, operating  a t 80%  (efficiency)," would p roduce 7.5 kg of 
w eapons-g rade plutonium in less  than a year of civilian operation which is 
sufficient for a  15 kiloton nuclear device.®® Adding to  th e  potency of the natural 
uranium reactor is th a t extraction of w eapons-g rade plutonium from a  GCR or 
HWR reactor can "be accom plished by chemical m ethods which m eans a 
simpler and less  dem anding  process" for the  would-be proliférant.®® Overall, such 
a  program allows a  NN W S-state to achieve a  w eap o n s option in under two years 
if and w hen th e  required sophistication is achieved;
The reason light-water reactors are not as conducive for promoting plutonium is that the 
fuel is left in the reactor so long that 25 percent of the Pu239 is converted by reactions to Pu 240 
making it suitable for only unreliable and ine^cient weapons. See: Bernard L. Cohen, Nuclear 
Science and Society. Anchor Books: New York. 1974. p. 196.
Heavy water reactors using natural uraiuum allow for space and fuel rod changes that can 
be made without shutting down the reactor. As such, it is practical to change and chemically 
reprocess the fuel to remove the plutonium more frequently and thereby keep the Pu 240 content 
below 10 percent. See: Bernard L. Cohen. Nuclear Science and Society. Anchor Books: New York. 
1974. p. 196.
"  Ibid. p. 41.
Meyer, op. cit.. p. 37.
Van Cleave, p. 46.
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...n ine to twelve m onths reactor operation, 30-90 d ays cooling, 2-3 
m onths of separation  and  plutonium metal production, and  perhaps 
an o th e r 30 d ay s  for fabrication of the first w eapon  If a  w eapons 
laboratory w ere already in operation and  th e  n ecessa ry  design 
resea rch  had  been  conducted.®'*
In contrast, u se  of the  LWR-type power reac to r com plicates the phasal 
path tow ards the  w eapons option. The fissile m aterial th at could be extracted 
from th e  LWR-type reactor requires 3% uranium enrichm ent for civilian use , and 
90% percen t enrichm ent for w eapons-grade U 235. The isotopic separation of 
the  U 235 from th e  m ore plentiful U 238 dem and special enrichm ent techniques. 
The four m ethods of uranium enrichment include: (a) g a seo u s  diffusion; (b) 
centrifugation; (c) electrom agnetic; and, (d) laser isotope. A would-be proliférant 
is likely to  avoid lase r  separation  a s  it en tails a  costly level of technical capability. 
In contrast, centrifugation proves the m ost likely m ethod adop ted  by small 
nations th at lack th e  technology or the capital n ecessa ry  for a  m ore complex 
method of separation.®®
T he n eed  for enrichm ent, and the  difficulty th a t a NNW S-state m ay have 
in purchasing or developing an  enrichment capability, su g g e sis  that the lead time 
is effectively increased  if a LWR-type reactor is th e  cen terp iece of a civilian 
power p rogram . Notwithstanding, a determ ined NNW S-state, "even without a
Ibid. p. 48. 
Ibid. p. 50.
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basic  nuclear-related infrastructure... m ay only require, on average, roughly six 
y ears  from program  start to produce its first bomb."®® For the m ore advanced  
civilian powers, however, the  lead time can b e  shortened  to anyw here from two 
y ears  to two m onths:
It would be  sim ple m atter for nations like Jap an , Germany, 
Sw itzerland, and  C anada  to build a  num ber of w eapons in a  m atter 
of m onths, with no advanced  preparation.®’
Again, the  civilian path tow ards a  latent nuclear w eapons option should be  
understood a s  a  phasal activity. Essentially, each  rung achieved within the  
civilian program  rep resen ts  a  m ore potent s tep  along th e  ladder of latent 
w eapons potential: (See: Figure 2.):
Meyer, op. cit.. p. 37. 
Deutch, op. cit.. p. 125.
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Figure 2. A Phasal Ladder Toward thg Nudear Weapons Capability
R ung 1:The basic scientific, technical, and industrial know-how.
R ung 2:The acquisition of research reactors.
R ung 3:The acquisition of a  power reactor. A g rea te r significance 
is em placed on GCR -type and  HWR-type reacto rs a s  they  a re  the  
m ost conducive to a  w eap o n s capability.
R ung 4:The acquisition of the  m ean s necessary  for extraction of 
fissile material. The special attention is paid to chem ical separation  
capabilities, followed by enrichm ent capabilities.
R ung 5:The weapon design.
R ung 6:The acquisition o f delivery systems. The em p h asis  is upon 
a  dom estic ballistic missile program s, and o ther forms of m issiles 
and air-breathing m ean s  of delivery.
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B ased on th e  implications of th e  phasal ladder, a  NN W S-state garner the  
latent w eapons option a t Rung 4.; th e  total nuclear fuel cycle. Rung 4., for 
exam ple, rem oves all the  d e p e n d en c e  any NNW S-state would have on a foreign 
supplier for either heavy water, natural uranium, or enriched uranium. As such, 
NPT regim e obstacles designed  to  im pede proliferation a re  effectively overcom e 
a s  th e  NNW S-state now h as  th e  ability to exploit civilian capabilities for a  nuclear 
w eap o n s option.
An added implication of th e  phasal ladder is that a  NN W S-state could 
obtain a  latent option by purposely structuring a  civilian program  along Rungs 2. 
and 4. Specifically, a GCR or HW R-type research  reactor com bined with a 
m ethod of reprocessing or enrichm ent allows a  small research-orien ted  nuclear 
program  to offer a  latent nuclear w eap o n s option. The final s tep  in th e  possible 
exploitation of a  latent option is th e  capability to deliver th e  atom ic device (Rung 
6 .).
While preventing a c ce ss  to  Rung 6. m ay have a t one  time b een  possible, 
no current NNW S-state is in anyw ay restricted from the m ean s of delivery. For 
instance, a s  of 1995, m ost would-be second  p h a se  proliférants have developed, 
or a re  researching into, an indigenous ballistic missile delivery capability: (See: 
Table 3.)
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Table 3. Ballistic Missile Possession and Ranges
Indigenous U nder Development 
Production
Range (km)
C ountries with advanced 
missile or SLV programs:
Range (km)
Israel
India
10,000
1,450
240
5,000
2,400
13,000
Countries that deploy 
indigenous short-range missiles:
North Korea:
Egypt
Iran
South Korea
280
280
130
240
600
1,200
160
N.A.
Countries engaged in 
missile R&D:
Brazil
South Africa
Argentina
Taiwan
Pakistan
Indonesia
4,000
1,450
1,200
600
600
100
Notes: All ranges a re  given in kilom eters, a re  maximums, and a ssu m e  missile 
sy stem 's  standard payload.
Source: The Military B alance 1990-91. London: B rassey’s. 1990. p. 47-52. Aaron 
Karp,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation," SIRPI Yearbook 1991. Stockholm: SIRPl. 
1991. p. 337-43.
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In addition, the lack of ballistic m issile technology can be  supplanted  by 
the  u se  of aircraft, cruise m issiles, an d  o ther air-breathing vehicles, that a re  
"relatively sim ple and readily available" for delivering a  w eapon of m ass 
destruction.^® Furthermore, the  m ore ad v an ced  nations, like Jap an  and India, 
have satellite launch vehicle (SLV) capabilities. SLVs are  a lso  known a s  ballistic 
missile delivery system s with intercontinental range. Simply put. Rung 6. is not 
an  obstacle  against horizontal proliferation. In fact, only by obstructing all a c ce ss  
to R ungs 1 through 4  could a  NNW S-state b e  prevented from acquiring a  latent 
w eapons option: (See: Figure 2.). However, in light of the prolific sp read  of 
civilian nuclear power, it m ay unreasonab le  to su g g est that a c c e ss  to the  
essentia l com ponents can  be  controlled.
Second Phase Diffusion
Determining the num ber of N W S-states within the  second  p h ase  begins 
with an evaluation of latent capabilities. Specifically, b e c au se  civilian power 
p rogram s have such profound implications for which s ta te  is considered nuclear 
w eapons-capable, calculating the num ber of N W S-states now d ep en d s on an 
evaluation of latent potential. Furthermore, overt declarations, like nuclear 
testing, a re  no longer an  indicator of nuclear s ta tu s  or w eapons capability since
Bailey, op,_cit.. p. 103.
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advents in technology permit NNW S-states to "disregard nuclear testing without 
fear of sacrificing e ither reliability or sophistication in w eap o n s design ."^  Still, 
analysts continue to  wrongftjily equate  the  num ber of overt declarations with the 
num ber of nuclear w eap o n s states:
O ur worst fea rs  about proliferation have not m aterialized, th e  pace 
of proliferation h a s  slowed. Counting d e c ad e s , s ince 1945 ...only 
India exploded such  a  device, and  none did in th e  fourth o r the 
first-half o f th e  fifth.®°
A m ore reliable estim ate  of future horizontal proliferation m ust avoid 
equating the  atom ic tes t with proliferation a s  a  N W S-state d o es  not need to test. 
Overt declarations a re  further unlikely a s  a  NN W S-state is unlikely to favor open 
contravention of th e  NPT unless strategically n ecessa ry . In addition, a  second 
p h ase  NN W S-state m ay fear the  repercussions that o p en  proliferation would 
have for regional stability. Instead of focusing on overt signals, accurate  
estim ates of seco n d  p h a se  proliferation and  nuclear diffusion, m ust begin by 
acknowledging th a t there  a re  s ta te s  which a re  declared  non-nuclear w eapons 
powers but a re  nuc lear w eapons capable. T he implication for nuclear diffusion is 
that a  second  p h a se  NN W S-state has th e  essentia l nuclear parts for deterrence, 
and h as  th e  added  option of choosing w hen to exploit this option.
' Deutch. op. cit. p. 121-123.
Peter R. Beckman, eL aU The Nuclear Predicament. Englewood Clifis: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
1992, p. 272.
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Given th e  logic of nuclear diffusion, th e se  cap ab le  but undeclared NWS- 
s ta te s  a re  expected  to  overtly proliferate if the  s ta te 's  ex istence  is in explicit 
jeopardy. Until th e  s ta te  is existentially th rea tened , opacity of sta tus serves the 
stra teg ic  in terests  of th e  sta te . Specifically, it rem oves the possibility that by 
going nuclear you invite an unneeded threat or undesired  reaction. Nonetheless, 
opacity can not se rv e  the  e n d s  of d eterrence a s  a  credible deterren t requires 
declaration. As a  result, latent status m ay rep resen t only a  transition stage that 
now p reced es  seco n d  p h ase  nuclear diffusion.
Under the  latent s ta tu s  criteria, for exam ple, an  additional thirty-six s ta te s  
in 1982 p o ssesse d  the  advanced  level of nuclear infrastructure needed for a 
nuclear device.®’ A m ore recen t estim ate claims th a t over 40  s ta te s  could go 
nuclear if necessary.®^ The implication of both of th e s e  estim ates is that 
susceptibility and  mitigation a re  the influencing factors in w hether these latent 
nuclear powers ch o o se  to ev er exploit their latent options.
Future Second Phase Diffusion
In the seco n d  p h ase, civilian nuclear pow er h a s  permitted the NNWS-
Stephen Meyer distinguishes an advanced nuclear-related infrastructure as a level in 
capability which allows a state to produce a nuclear weapon in less than two years. Qualifying this 
conclusion is that this suggested level should include the possession of plutonium producing reactor, 
coupled with reprocessing or enrichment facilities. See: Meyer, p. 37-40.
Joseph S. Nye Jr., "New Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation Policy," Science vol. 256, 
May 1992, p. 1293.
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State to effectively em ulate  th e  nuclear capabilities without declaring its 
newfound w eapons capability. Of course, certain NN W S-states have pursued a  
m ore surreptitious miiitary-style w eap o n s program . Even am ong such  sta tes, 
civilian nuclear pow er w as critical to the  w eap o n s program . For example, India, 
and Pakistan, used civilian pow er a s  the  foundation for their w eapons program.
In addition, Iraq, Iran, and  North Korea, pu rsued  their nuclear w eapons program 
through similar civilian m ean s. T he deviation aw ay from overt emulation, 
however, has p erpetuated  a  d an g ero u s m isconception that the  num ber of 
nuclear w eapons-capable  s ta te s  is limited to five, with ano ther four or five 
su sp ec ted  NW S-states. W hat latent option su g g ests , however, is th a t the  
possible extent of second  p h a se  nuclear diffusion is considerably higher since 
num erous NNW S-states a re  a lready nuclear w eap o n s capable.
The large num ber of latent nuclear pow ers su g g e sts  that the dynamic of 
nuclear diffusion could have dram atic co n seq u en ces  for the  second phase. 
Specifically, if an unm itigated nuclear contagion is introduced, second p h ase  
nuclear diffusion could prove uncontrollable within a  region comprised of 
num erous latent nuclear w eap o n s powers. T he structure of the  second p h ase  
dynamic could develop a s  follows:
The Second Phase Dynamic
IF the STRATEGIC CONTEXT - Is perceived a s  filled with explicit
security threats;
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IF STATE - A - Introduces a  nuclear w eapons capability into the 
environm ent;
IF STATE B - P erceives a  th reat to its security from such  
capabilities, then  infection to the  nuclear contagion is possible;
STATE B, th e n  - h as  the option to react accordingly w hen capable;
FO R STATE B - Of the  options available, a  possible reaction is to 
obtain a  latent nuclear option or em ulate  the  nuclear w eapons 
capabilities of s ta te  A.
IF STATE B - d o es  em ulate, or follow through and exploit its latent 
nuclear option, and if a overt nuclear w eapons capability is 
declared, diffusion has occurred.
C o n se q u e n tly , the  risk of su b seq u en t proliferation in creases  as 
o ther c ap ab le  NN W S-states m ay also  perceive a  threat from the 
previous ac t of nuclear w eapons proliferation.
Not surprisingly, opacity of nuclear s ta tu s  m ay have already disguised 
ac ts  of second  p h a se  nuclear diffusion. For exam ple, Pakistan 's quest for a  
n uclear w eapons capability is sup p o sed  to have begun in resp o n se  to the  
perceived  nuclear th rea t posed  by India's believed nuclear w eapons program.®® 
T he historical ev idence su g g ests  th at India's atomic w eapons program w as in 
reaction to  the  direct nuclear th reat posed by China.®^ Similar a c ts  of nuclear 
diffusion a re  evident betw een Argentina and  Brazil, Israel and  Iraq, and Israel
”  For a contemporary review of the threat posed by nuclear weapons in South Asia; Sec, 
Arms Control Today. June 1993. For an interesting account of how significant the threat between 
India and Pakistan: See, Seymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," The New Yorker. March 29, 
1993.
DiisL
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and Iran. The unwillingness to d eclare  th ese  interactions a s  instances of nuclear 
diffusion is th a t only supposition guides conclusions in a b se n c e  of a  clear 
declarations of sta tus.
N evertheless, it is fo reseeab le  th at if th ese  su sp ec ted  proliférants desire  a 
stab le  de te rren t they m ust a lso  d ec lare  their nuclear capabilities. Put differently, 
credible d e te rren ce  can only begin with an enunciation of th e  nuclear capability. 
Opacity m ay serv e  current in terests, but if de te rrence  is to accom plish a  nuclear 
p e a ce  it m ust b e  unequivocal to both parties that th e  nuclear gam e can in fact be  
played by both - and thus should not be  played a t all. As such, in the  ab sen c e  of 
mitigation, com bined with the p rese n c e  of absolu te  susceptibility, the  desire for 
g rea te r d e te rren ce  will dem and an  end  to opacity. In any  event, the  paradigm of 
nuclear diffusion, even in the a b se n c e  of declared s ta tus, still perm its the 
analysis to focus on issu es  of regional susceptibility and  mitigation, to ignore th e  
general irrelevance of capability, and  to consider why a  NN W S-state would "go 
nuclear."
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Chapter 6; Northeast Asia
N ortheast Asia operated  for over forty-five y ea rs  within th e  confines of a 
Cold W ar. Underscoring the  Cold W ar w as the  th rea t of a  nuclear w ar betw een 
the  Soviet Union and  the  United S ta te s . Yet, the  recen t d em ise  of th e  Cold W ar 
failed to rem ove either the  nuclear th rea t or the concerns over national security.
The Post-Cold War Environment
T he direction that th e  reordering of th e  post-Cold W ar structure  will tak e  in 
the  coming years  rem ains quite unclear. W hat the  co llapse  of the  Soviet Union 
e n su re s  is a  m arkedly different international structure from th e  bi-polar order th at 
characterized  the  Cold War. For instance, it m ay be, a s  it a rgued  by som e 
scholars, th a t two levels of structure a re  emerging within th e  g rea te r 
international system .
At th e  system ic level, for exam ple, ap p aren t Am erican unipolarity has 
replaced global bipolarity:
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Am erican p reem inence is based  on the fact th a t it is th e  only 
country with the military, diplomatic, and econom ic, a s s e ts  to  b e  a 
decisive player in any conflict in w hatever part o f th e  world it 
c h o o ses  to involve itself.’
T h e  future of an  Am erican-led unipolar structu re  is deba tab le. Differences 
in econom ic and dem ographic growth among m ajor pow ers will contribute to the  
rise of a m ajor power, like India or China, that could s e e k  to  challenge and  usurp 
American unipolarity. As such , American global preem inence  only reflects an 
international system  th at temporarily lacks an an a lo g o u s m ajor power.® 
Consequently , th e  future stability and  the security of th e  post-Cold W ar structure 
rem ains in considerable doubt.
In contrast, while a  sem blance  of unipolarity m ay exist, the  lo ss of 
bipolarity h as  already had co n seq u en ces  a t the sub-system ic level. According to 
Goldgeier and Mcfaul, s e ts  "of regional su b sy stem s in which clusters of 
contiguous s ta te s  interact" h av e  emerged.® This regional division h a s  developed 
along two general lines. Within o n e  region, "the core," pervasive security risks 
no longer persist. In contrast, within "the periphery," insecurities prevail am ong
- Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Rethinking America's Security ed. 
Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 1992, p. 24.
* The use of demographics and economics is based on the logic that drove the major power analysis 
utilized in The War Ledger. See: Kugler and Organski, op. cit.
’ James M. Goldgeier, and Michael Mcfaul, " A tale of two worlds: core and periphery, in 
the post-cold war era," International Organizations, vol. 46 no. 2, Spring 1992, p. 477-479.
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the  various s ta te  actors:
In the core, econom ic interdependence, political dem ocracy, and 
nuclear wreapons lesse n  th e  security dilemma; th e  major powers 
have no p ressu re  for expansion...Conflicts do  not d isappear, but 
they  a re  not resolved militarily. In the  periphery, however, absolute 
de te rren ts that might induce caution do not exist... and th e  security 
dilem ma is still param ount."
T he regionalization of the  international structure, a s  described by Mcfaul 
and Goldgeier, su g g e sts  th a t an opaque NN W S-state m ay begin to operate 
within conditions conducive to  inciting increased susceptibility. Increased 
regional threats, for instance, will complicate security  calculations a s  a  NNWS- 
sta te  is forced "to com pare its strength with a num ber of others."® The 
implication for nuclear diffusion is that d isturbances within the milieu affect 
susceptibility and lead to  an  increased  proclivity th a t the  NNW S-state will 
proliferate. While the reordering of the  post-Cold W ar international system  m ay 
have had  an  impact, understanding  the effects on a  given region, like N ortheast 
Asia, requires the  undertaking of a more thorough regional analysis.
® Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, 
vol. 18, no.2. Fall 1993, p. 71.
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Northeast Asia - A Regional Analysis
T he actors within Northeast Asian th ea te r num ber sev en  s ta te s  in total. 
Among th e  seven , two international actors, specifically R ussia and  the  U.S., now 
differ significantly with respect to current regional im portance and  influence. The 
post-Cold W ar decline of R ussian pow er h as  served  to streng then  the position of 
the  United S ta te s  a s  the region's only superpow er. T he primary regional actors 
include Taiwan, China, South Korea, North Korea, and  Jap an . Future security 
calculations within post-Cold W ar N ortheast Asia will inevitably reflect the  
interactions betw een the  United S ta te s  and  the region, and the  inter-dealings 
betw een the  region's five primary actors.
T he nuclear threat is o n e  factor that will affect post-Cold W ar security 
calculations within N ortheast Asia. In the  past, for instance, security calculations 
have b een  affected by the nuclear threat. In fact, not only h as  th e  nuclear threat 
persisted  to  impinge upon national security for over five d e c ad e s , but N ortheast 
Asia is th e  only world region that h a s  w itnessed an  ac t of atom ic attack, th rea ts  
of atom ic attack, overt proliferation, and  opaque proliferation: (See: Table 4.).
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Table 4. Nuclear Coercion and Brinkmanship in Northeast Asia
The Event T he Players
1945 WWII U.S./ Jap an
1950 Korean W ar U .S./ China/ 
North Korea/ 
S outh Korea
The Action
Atomic Attack 
(Explicit Use)
Atomic Threat 
(Implicit Use)
1955 Taiwan Crisis U.S./China/ 
Taiwan
Atomic Threat 
(Implicit Use)
1957/58 S econd  U .S ./C h ina / Atomic Threat
Taiwan Crisis Taiwan (Implicit Use)
1992-? North Koraa U.S./North K orea/ Proliferation? 
Atomic W eap o n s South K orea/ (Diffusion?)
Program  Ja p an
Source: William T. Tow, Encountering th e  Dominant P la v e r  U.S- 
Extended D eterrence S tra tegy  in th e  A sia-Pacific. New York: 
Columbia University P ress . 1991.
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As for th e  regional role played by nuclear w eapons, it developed along 
two broad lines. Along one line w as the ex tension of ex tended nuclear 
d e te rrence  by th e  United S ta te s  and the  form er Soviet Union over respective 
allies and/or proxies. Up to 1979, three regional actors, including Taiwan, Japan  
and South Korea, w ere under the  American nuclear umbrella.® In com parison, 
during the  Cold W ar, th e  form er Soviet Union w as held a s  the  de  facto guarantor 
of both North Korea and China.
The o ther line of developm ent w as th e  proliferation of open and  latent 
nuclear w eapon capabilities am ong the region 's five actors. At p resen t, each  of 
the  five acto rs vary in the  deg ree  of nuclear w eapons potential. In o rder to 
a s s e s s  the  risk for post-Cold W ar nuclear diffusion, a  review of the  region 's 
civilian nuclear capabilities is necessary  to estab lish  which actors p o s s e s s  a 
latent nuclear w eap o n s option.
Civilian Nuclear Power
It is c lear that each  actor m ade a  concerted  effort to expand its civilian 
nuclear capabilities. Over one 18 year period, from 1970 to 1988, th e  num ber of 
power reactors, th e  source for w eapons-g rade  fissile material, increased  from 4  in
® The formal security commitment with the state of Taiwan was rescinded in 1979 in order 
to facilitate further reapproachment with China.
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to 52: (S ee: Table 5 .) /
Table s .  Nuclear Power in Northeast Asia 
# of CR Operable # of RR Operable
1970 1988 1989
Jap an  4 38 18
Taiwan 0 6 5
North Korea 0 0 2
South Korea 0 8 3
China 0 3* 9
Sources: IAEA, U.S. D epartm ent of Energy. 
Notes: Data a s  of S ep tem b er 1989.
*Under Construction.
CR- Commercial P ow er R eactor 
RR- R esearch  R eac to r
Still, th e  num ber of pow er reac to rs  is not a  sufficient m easure  of a  region’s  
laten t w eap o n s  potential. An accu ra te  m easu re  of laten t potential beg ins with a 
review of e ach  s ta te 's  civilian-related nuclear capabilities.
 ̂ Prior to any assessment, an important caveat must first be noted. Each state, excluding 
North Korea, is an emerging or current economic powers which must contend with meager internal 
resources for powering their respective infrastructures and economies. Given the dearth of domestic 
power resources, the prolific and expanded use of nuclear power is very justifiable. Notwithstanding, 
even a justified civilian application can not remove the duality of use which has a clear and potent 
military* utilitv.
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Japan
By 1991, Jap an 's  nuclear power program  provided 23.8%  of the  sta te ’s  total 
electricity.® A comparison with the  regions o ther acto rs show s that Jap an  is ranked 
third in overall dep en d en ce  on nuclear power. J a p an 's  program is ranked first, 
however, with respec t to the nuclear program 's technical advancem en t and 
sophistication.® Specifically, Ja p an  is the  only regional actor in a  position to achieve 
a full dom estic nuclear fuel cycle by 2000 .’° Concem ing Ja p an 's  latent potential, 
the  com ponents m ost important to  the  generation  of fissile material a re  a s  follows; 
(See: Table 6.):
® Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. 1992. IAEA.
’ Japan is the only regional actor to have two domestic reprocessing facilities, has 38 reactors 
on line, and is the only state researching and planning the operation of the Fast-Breeder reactor - an 
optimal plutonium producer.
" BïiiL
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T able 6 : Japan: C ivilian-R elated  C apabilities
Possession of: Proliferation Risk: # of:
Power Reactors:
HWR-type Plutonium  Producers 1
PW R-type Uranium Enrichm ent Req'd 11
BWR-type Uranium Enrichm ent Req'd 25
GCR-type Optimal Plutonium Producer 1
FBR-type G e n e ra te s  Plutonium 1
Reprocessing/Enrichment Facilities:
Pu R eprocessor Extraction of Plutonium 2
Ur Enrichment P ossib le  Enrichm ent to 90% 1
Source: Statistic provided from Nuclear Power R eactors in th e  W orld.
IAEA 1992.
Notes: HWR- Heavy W ater Reactor; PWR-Light W ater Reactor; 
BWR-LlghtWater Reactor; Graphite-C ooled Reactor; FBR- F a s t B reeder 
Reactor.
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Among J ap an 's  civilian capabilities, two of its reactor-types (the BWR, PWR) 
a re  variations of light w ater-m oderated  generating facilities th a t require separate  
uranium enrichment up to 3% U 235  for power generation and 90% enrichment for 
w eapons-grade fissile material. S uch  w eapons-grade enrichm ent is readily provided 
by Ja p an 's  dom estic enrichm ent capabilities. The fuel pellets of a  PW R and BWR- 
reac to r a lso  produce a  certain quantity of w eap o n s-g rad e  plutonium. In addition, 
th e  GCR and HWR reactors a re  even  m ore plutonium optimal th en  th e  previous 
reactors types. Jap an  also h a s  th e  p resen t capability to chemically reprocess such 
w eapons-grade plutonium. As for th e  M ure, J a p an  pow er p lans h av e  focused on 
replacing all power reactors by the  yea r 2030 with fast-b reeder reactors: the m ost 
optimal producer of w eap o n s-g rad e  plutonium.”
The greatest concern over Ja p an 's  latent nuclear w eapons-m aking capability 
cen te rs  on the question of plutonium dem and and supply.’® A 1992 SIRPI 
calculation of Jap an 's  plutonium su g g ests  that "even with the  m ost optimistic plans 
for plutonium use, J a p an  canno t avoid acquiring a surplus of a t least 10 tons" of 
w eapons-g rade plutonium.’® Even by the  b est estim ate, according to SIRPI 
calculations, Jap an 's  nuclear pow er program "may have difficulty burning 30 tons"
’ Bïid*
William Walker, and Frans Berkhout, "Japan's Plutonium Problem-And Europe's," 
Arms Control Today. September 1992, p. 5*
■-’ Ibid. p. 6-7.
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of th e  60-70 tons estim ated  a s  n ecessary  for civilian-use.’" J a p an 's  plutonium 
designs raise specific concerns s ince this fuel is the  m ost optimal fissile material for 
a NN W S-state wishing to acquire an  exploitable latent nuclear w eap o n s option. 
Overall, the  depth and quality of Ja p an 's  civilian-related nuclear capabilities indicate 
that ev e ry  rung o n  th e  lad d e r h as  been  effectively su rp assed . S ta ted  som ew hat 
differently, Jap an  is a  latent nuclear w eapons power.
Sowth Korea
Nuclear power is indeed the  pillar of South Korean electric power generation. 
By 1991, 8 nuclear reactors produced 47.5% of all electrical power. South Korea's 
civilian program  is now designed  to expand to 12 operational pow er reactors by 
2002. This civilian capability provides South Korea with th e  essen tia l m ea n s  from 
which to obtain th e  necessa ry  fissile material. T he civilian nuclear capabilities 
related to this w eap o n s option a re  the following; (See: Table 7.):
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Table 7. South Korea: Civilian-Related Capabilities
Possession of: Proliferation Risk: #  of:
Power Reactors:
PW R-type Uranium Enrichment Req'd 7
HWR-type Plutonium Producer 1
No Known Reprocessing/ Enrichment Facilities
Source: S ta ts  provided from Nuclear Pow er R eacto rs in the  W orld: 
1992 IAEA.
N otes: HWR-Heavy W ater Reactor; PWR-Light W ater R eactor.
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With resp ec t to the  structure of th e  civilian program , South Korea is the 
world's only NNW S-state to  op era te  both an  Am erican-styled light-water type 
reac to r and a  C anadian-designed  CANDU heavy-w ater reactor. T he combination 
raises suspicion since a  heavy-water CANDU-reactor provides South Korea with a 
much g rea te r nuclear weapons-m aking capability. In contrast, the  American-styled 
PW R reacto r requires an additional enrichm eni capability th a t South Korea 
currently lacks.
At present. South Korea d ep en d s  on the  United S ta te s  for the  3% uranium 
enrichm ent required for fueling its LWR-facilities. However, th e  CANDU allows 
South Korea a c c e ss  to  w eapons-g rade  plutonium th at d em an d s much simpler 
m ethods of extraction.
The CANDU reactor is a  natural uranium-fuelled reactor th at provides South 
Korea with undeniable a c c e ss  to w eapons-g rade  plutonium.’® A South Korean 
latent option is actualized once a dom estic reprocessing facility is acquired. A 
South Korean attem pt to  purchase a  comm on sm all-scale reprocessing  plant from 
F rance w as su sp en d ed  in 1976 under U.S. p ressu re .’® Still, given South Korea's 
level of high-tech advancem ent, it se em s  reasonab le  th at South  Korea could 
develop a reprocessing or enrichm ent capability should it be  necessary .
Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread. Baltimore: Penguin Books. 1966, p. 87-100. 
Leonard Spector, "Silent Spread," Foreign Policy. 1984, p. 70-71.
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Taiwan
Taiwan h as  utilized civilian nuclear power in order to satisfy a  rapacious 
need for energy. By 1991, for instance, nuclear power accounted for 37.8%  of all 
electricity generated. This comm itm ent to civilian nuclear power h as  also provided 
Taiwan with a c lear latent nuclear w eapons option. The civilian capabilities 
considered critical for a  latent w eap o n s option a re  a s  follows: (See: Table 8.):
Table 8. Taiwan: Civilian-Related Capabilities
P ossession  of: Proliferation Risk: #  of:
Power Reactors:
PWR-type Uranium Enrichm ent Req'd 4
BWR-type Uranium Enrichm ent R eq’d 2
Reprocessing/Enrichment Facilities:
Pu R eprocessor Pu Extraction 1
Source: S ta ts  provided from Nuclear Pow er Reactors in th e  World: IAEA. 
1992
Notes: HWR-Heavy W ater Reactor; PWR-Light W ater Reactor.
Taiwan's latent nuclear w eap o n s capability requires an effective extraction 
of th e  fissile material available from its PWR and BWR facilities. T he na tu re  of 
th ese  facilities implies that either an  enrichment or reprocessing capability is critical 
for th e  separation of w eapons-g rade  fissile material. According to intelligence
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reports, Taiwan com pleted th e  construction of an  unsafeguarded reprocessing  
facility in the  1980's.’  ̂ Given th e se  overall capabilities, Taiwan can b e  confirmed 
a  latent nuclear w eapon power.
North Korea
The capabilities that highlight North Korea's civilian atomic program exemplify 
how a NNWS-state structures an  embryonic nuclear program for a  latent capability. 
Specifically, North Korea's capabilities are all optimal for extracting w eap o n s-g rad e  
plutonium:(See: Table 9.);
Table 9, North Korea; Ciyilian-Related .Capabilities 
Possession  of: Proliferation Risk: #  of:
Research Reactors:
GCR-type Plutonium P roducer 2
Reprocessing/Enrichment Facilities:
Pu R eprocessor Plutonium Extraction 1
Source: S ta ts  provided from Nuclear Pow er Reactors in the  W orld: 
IAEA 1992.
Notes: GCR-Graphite Cooled Reactor.
Ibid. p. 70-74.
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T he "concern about Pyongyang's nuclear intentions em erged  in th e  early 
1980's w hen U.S. intelligence agencies detected  th e  construction of a second larger 
resea rch  reactor."’® T h ese  concerns increased  once it w as  realized that an 
uncommonly large 30-Mwe research  reactor w as accom panied with a reprocessing 
facility.’® U.S. intelligence has estim ated that th e  30-Mwe gas-graphite reactor is 
"capable of producing enough plutonium for abou t one nuclear w eapons annually."®® 
Furtherm ore, "it. . . a p p ears  that a  third, still larger reactor may b e  under 
co nstruc tion .. .yield(ing) even  greater quantities of plutonium-bearing sp en t fuel - 
perhaps enough for several nuclear w eapons annually."®’
The m ost incriminating a sp ec t of North Korea’s  program  is that its embryonic 
s ta g e  of developm ent, which w as supposed  to be  focused  on research, preclude 
any  reaso n ab le  justification for a  reprocessing capability. Consequently, North 
Korea has b een  able  to construct a  rudimentary program  that w as organized entirely 
in a m anner conducive to the  w eapons option. Given the  m ost recent intelligence 
from 1993, that su g g ests  that North Korea m ay h av e  rem oved up to 50 tons of 
sp en t fuel from o n e  of its research  reactors with enough fissile material for two to
■ ® Leonard S. Spector, and Jacqueline R. Smith, "North Korea: The Next Nuclear 
Nightmare?" Arms Control Todav. March 1991. p. 9.
Ibid, Please note: The Mwe size of most research reactors is in the 1 to 5 Mwe range.
-=DîiîL
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th ree  nuclear bom bs.“  it is quite plausible that North Korea is a  NN W S-state with 
two or th ree  nuclear w eap o n s a t  its d isposal/^  At the  very least, North Korea has 
a  c lear laten t option that it can readily exploit.
China
Although China is the  region’s only declared nuclear w eap o n s  power, its 
civilian atom ic program  h as  failed to progress anyw here n ea r actual energy 
production. China’s  goal for th e  civilian atom ic program is that it will eventually 
provide 20%  of the energy  dem anded in the  coming decades.^^ In order to fulfill this 
goal, th ree  PW R-type facilities a re  under construction.
”  David E. Sanger, "North Korea Stirs New Fears on A-Anns," The New York Times May 
6,1993. p. 2.
According to intelligence reports over the last four years it is unclear whether or not North 
Korea possesses a rudimentary nuclear device. For example, a diplomat who defected in 1991 
suggested that North Korea was only a year to two years away from a nuclear weapons capability. 
Please See: Paul Shin, "Defector Says N. Korea Building Atom Bomb," The Washington Post. Sept 
14, 1991. p. A 20. In addition, a 1^ 3 CIA report to President Clinton stated that North Korea has 
probably already assembled one or two nuclear devices. Please See: Robin Wright, "China Opposes 
Sanctions for North Korea," The New York Times. Dec 27,1993. p. A 10.
World Nuclear Factbook. IAEA. 1991.
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An Analysis of Northeast Asian Civilian-Programs
Drawing definitive conclusions from an  analysis of th e  region 's civilian 
nuclear capabilities is unfortunately difficult. Lack of resources justifies why civilian 
nuclear pow er has ex panded  throughout N ortheast Asia. Nevertheless, dua l-use  
implies that the  military utility of this capability can  not be  removed, and should  not 
be ignored.
After reviewing the  latent potential of the  region, each acto r is a lready  able  
to su rp a ss  either R ung 3 or R ung  4 on th e  phasal ladder of proliferation. Put 
differently. North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and  Japan, a re  latent nuclear 
w eapons powers. In fact, a s id e  from South  Korea, wnich lacks a  known 
reprocessing capability, every regional actor h as  available a  latent nuclear w eap o n s 
option. A s such, if th e  capability is already garnered , it is only political motivation, 
in light of susceptibility and mitigation, that p reven ts the  NNW S-state's decision­
m akers from exploiting the  w eap o n s option.^®
B ecause  of latent potential, nuclear s ta tu s  could change quickly to  reflect
Although building an atomic device is not without its difficulty, one can safely conclude 
that given the dissemination o f basic warhead know-how, and the high-level of technological status 
shared by Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, it should be the nation of North Korea that faced the 
greatest diffîculty in following through on a nuclear option. If current intelligence is accurate, 
however, even a technologically backward North Korea can construct a number of rudimentary 
atomic devices. Therefore, it seems fair and reasonable to presume that the other r^ on al actors 
are also quite capable of doing so.
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new  an d  troubling stra teg ic  c ircum stances. Specifically, so m e  NN W S-state. like 
J a p a n  and  Taiwan, have th e  latent nuclear m ean s with which to immediately 
respond to an  unmitigated nuclear threat. Consequently, introducing an  unmitigated 
nuclear contagion m ay then  contribute to rapid diffusion if th e  d eg ree  of 
susceptibility preven ts th e  NNW S-state from accepting vulnerability. In order to 
exploring the degree  of susceptibility within th e  region, the analysis now shifts to an 
in-depth exam ination of how the  various ac to rs perceive their security  milieu.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 7; The Security Environment oLNortheast Asia
The p h en o m en a  of nuclear diffusion can  thrive within any environm ent 
im m ersed in considerab le  insecurity. The post-Cold W ar collapse of bi-polarity 
en su res  a t least uncertainty, if not outright insecurity.^ At a  minimum, th e  loss of bi­
polarity contributes to a  m ore self-help oriented sub-system  a s  regional acto rs m ust 
now contend with the  essen tia l capabilities of a  "...num ber of active players."^ As 
a  result, the d e g re e  of susceptibility to the nuclear contagion m ay begin to increase  
a s  th ese  s ta te s  struggle with an  environm ent in which they m ay lack th e  n ecessa ry  
nuclear m ean s for relative security.
B e c a u se  o f th e  collapse of th e  Cold W ar, self-help may becom e m ore 
param ount s in ce  th e  structural order that had  previously tem pered and  mitigated 
insecurities is now gone. An indication of this self-help behavior am ong th e  ac to rs 
of N ortheast A sia m ay be gauged  by examining th ree  interrelated factors. 
Specifically, military expenditures, military potential, and military capabilities, m ay 
indicate w hether the  region 's ac to rs  a re  feeding and  reacting to e a ch  o thers
' Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," 
International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, Winter 1993/94., p. 5.
- Morçenthau,jiiL^-, p. 350.
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perceptions of insecurity.
Northeast Asia; Military Expenditures and Capabilities
By 1991, A sia accounted  for 34 percent of total world military expenditures."^ 
South K orea and C hina rank in th e  top ten  of arm s im porters in term s of contracts  
concluded.'"* T he n a tu re  of th e  region 's military expenditures se em s to imply a  
persistent post-Cold W ar concern over national security. For exam ple, a s id e  from 
North Korea, every o th er actor’s  d efen se  budget has grown consistently since 1990. 
Moreover, this rate of growth continued even  a s  the  Cold W ar declined in regional 
significance: (See: T ab le  10.):
 ̂ Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," 
International Security vol. 18, no. 3, Winter 1993/94, p. 79.
Ibid.
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1990-Î
Ü.S.A. 291.4 272.95 270.9 258.87 -11.2
USSR 116.7
R ussia 52.51 39.68 29.12 -44.5
Jap an 28.73  32.68 35.94 39.71 +38.2
China* 6.06 6.11 6.71 7.31 +20.6
Taiwan 8.69 9.29 10.29 10.45 +20.3
S. Korea 10.62 10.77 11.19 12.06 +13.6
N. Korea 5.23 2.36 2.06 2.19 -58.1
Notes: F igures in U.S. dollars.
* Est/ actual exp 'd  :18.79 billion for 1991, 21.76 billion for 1992. 
Source; The Military B alance. London: lISS.®
 ̂ Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Stability," IntemationaLSecuritv. 1993/94, vol. 18, 
no. 3, p. 42.
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Aside from military expenditures, a  review of latent military potential is offered 
a s  an additional indicator of th e  extent to which an ac to r could th rea ten  the region 
in the  future. Specifically, a s  each  actor in creases  its pe rcen tag e  of military 
investment, the  dep th  and quality of military capability climbs along with the  
increase in total military expenditures. Among the five regional actors, for instance, 
each  sta te , excep t North Korea, a ssigns a relatively sm all p e rcen tag e  of GNP 
toward total d e fen se  expenditures. Consequently, an  actor's  military potential 
increases considerably once a  s ta te  chooses to recalculate expenditures based  on 
a  5% of G N P /defense ratio®: (S ee: Table 11. 12. and  13):^
 ̂The recalculation of defense expenditures is based on the data available in Tables II and
12.
' What I have done is used the data from tables 11. and 12. in order to calculate militar) 
potential in table 13.
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Table 11. Northeast Asia Defense Expenditures for 1991 
Defense Expenditures
Ja p an  30.83
China 18.79*
Taiwan 6.562
N. Korea 2.003
S. Korea 1.827
Source; SIRPI Yearbook 1991. 
Note: Figures in U.S. Billion Dollars. 
*Estim ated Figure.
Table 12. Northeast Asia: Prosperity and Power Potential 
China S. Korea Japan Taiwan(a) N.Korea(b)
P e r  Capita 
GN P
547.0 4,920.0 22,900.0 8,815 N/A
Total GNP 
(SBillion)
603.5 210.1 2 ,820.0 180.0 39.5
Population
(Millions)
1,102.4 42.7 123.2 20.5 22.0
S ource: International Security 1993/94 Volume 18. Number 3.
Note: GNP statistics for China, J a p an , and South Korea are  1989 figures. 
- F igures in U.S. dollars.
a . Taiwan figures are  from 1992
b. North Korean figures a re  from 1992.
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Iabk-I3: Northeast Asia's Potential Dtknse Expenditures.
Current*________5% Potential**
Jap an 30.83 141.0
Taiwan 6.562 9.0
China 18.79 30.177
North Korea 2.003 2.00
S outh Korea 10.77 10.5
* B ased on 1991 military expenditures
** B ased  on 1989 GNP figures for Jap an , China, South Korea, and 1992 
figures for Taiwan and  North Korea.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
An estim ation of an  actor’s  military potential dep en d s on how d e fen se  
expenditures a re  affected should they ever comprise 5% of total GNP. The obvious 
insight obtained is that increases in G N P/defense expense ratio augm ent the  overall 
military power of the  state. Furthermore, by examining military potential, a  mark is 
provided with which to  gauge  the  power that a  sta te  could have within the post-Cold 
W ar era . For exam ple, two of th e  primary actors, Jap an  and China, reflect the 
significance military potential could have for future regional security.
C hina 's econom y h as  increased  dramatically over the  last d e c ad e s . The 
sta te 's  GNP, for instance, increased  12% percent® alone in 1992. IMF calculations 
from 1993 declare  C hina's national econom y as  the  third largest globally. In 
addition, if China "achieves a  per-capita GNP one-fourth that of the  United S ta te s  
(about South K orea's ratio today), its total GNP [would] . . .su rp ass  that of the 
United States."® While C hina's d efen se  budget in 1993 w as estim ated  at only 
S7.31 billion, and is dwarfed by Ja p an 's  and Taiwan’s  military expenditures, the 
projected growth in its GNP implies that China's future military strength will improve 
considerably in th e  coming d ecad es . Consequently, th e  perception th a t China is 
a regional threat would increase  along with its defense outlays.
In com parison to China, Jap an  presently  outspends every Asian s ta te  on
® Please note: A more in depth review of China economic growth is offered in the coming 
pages when China is specifically examined.
® Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," International Securitv. vol. 18. no. 3., 
Winter 1993/94, p. 52.
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d e fe n se , even  though the  d e fen se  budget is fixed to 1% of its total GNP. In fact, 
J a p a n 's  military expenditures w ere seco n d  only to the  United S ta te s  in 1992.’° 
Total d e fe n se  expenditures, for instance, would so a r to  over 100 billion dollars 
should  Ja p an  choose  to adop t even  a  3% to 4%  G N P/defense expenditure ratio. 
Therefore, Ja p an 's  potential military strength rep resen ts  a capability th at if ever 
actualized will add to  a  regional perception that Jap an  is a  resurgent and  formidable 
military power.
While projecting military potential is helpful to  an analysis of regional security, 
it is only a  com ponent with which can a t b est estim ate  th e  ex tent of potential 
regional threat. W hereas external th rea t m ay b e  m ore substantively m easured  
through an exact appraisal of available military capabilities. The breakdow n of the  
reg ion 's conventional capabilities a re  a s  follows: (See: Table 14.).
Jeffery T. Bergner, The New Superpowers: Germany. Japan, the U.S. and the New World 
Order. New York: St Martin's Press, p. 170-186.
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Table 14. Comparison of Northeast Asian Armed Jorces 1992
GFD MBTs CA PSC Sub
U S A . 4 N.A. 278 110 61
Russia 53 9,800 1,320 54 86
Ja p an 13 1,210 564 64 17
China 101 + 7,500-8,000 5,850 54 46
Taiwan 22+ 459+ 518 33 4
S. Korea 24+ 1,800 470 38 4
N. Korea 30+ 3,000 732 3+ 26
Source: International Security, vol. 18, no. 3.
The Military B alance. lISS 1992-93 L ondon:B rassey’s.
Note: GFD-Ground Force Division; CA-Combat Aircraft; 
MBT-Main Battle Tanks; PSC-Principal Surface C om batants; 
Sub-Subm arines.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 1
A review of the  region 's military capabilities su g g e st that each  actor h as  
sufficient capabilities with which to project so m e pow er within its operating milieu. 
Specifically, it is c lear th a t North Korea h as  an  offensive conventional capability. 
South  Korea, with the  United S ta te s , h as  the  m ea n s  with which to defend th e  
peninsula should hostilities erupt. Ja p an , in contrast, b o a s ts  the  largest and m ost 
soph isticated  naval capability am ong its five regional actors. China, however, 
flaunts the  m ost significant land and air capabilities. Overall, the  ex tent of 
conventional capabilities is substantial and  could rep resen t reaso n ab le  th rea ts  for 
num erous regional actors.
The image that develops after a  review of the  region's military expenditures, 
military potential, and current capabilities, is that a  concern  over national security 
could be  warranted, and m ay increase  over the  coming post-Cold W ar period. The 
m ost telling indicator from this review is the  co nsisten t growth in military 
expend itu res am ong th e  ac to rs even  a s  the  Cold W ar subsided  from regional 
importance. In other words, som e persistent extem al th rea t m ust explain why th ese  
s ta te s  would continue to expend resources on national security. Still, none of th ese  
indicators identifies w here or why an  extem al threat is perceived. Instead, factors 
like military expenditures, military potential, and military capabilities, help feed an 
ac to r 's  general perceptions of the  ex tem al th rea ts  that intervene throughout the  
operating milieu. Deriving acto r 's  perceptions, while difficult, is d ep en d en t upon a 
further evaluation of e a ch  actor's own milieu.
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The Perceptions of the Players
P ercep tions a re  critical for a  decision-m aker a s  extem al th rea ts  are  not 
a lw ays explicit. Instead, extem al th rea ts  a re  often am biguous and  open to som e 
interpretation. Gauging perceptions, however, is crucial in deducing which salient 
others a  s ta te  views a s  th rea ts  or concerns to  national security. Within Northeast 
Asia, for exam ple, m ost post-Cold W ar perceptions se em  transfixed on the  
ex o g en o u s th rea ts  posed  by North Korea and  China.
T he fear over China is over its improving nuclear and  conventional military 
capabilities. The anxiety over North Korea is due to a  su sp ec ted  nuclear w eapons 
program. T he risk of future nuclear diffusion may hinge on th e  perceptions held by 
e a ch  of the  o ther ac to rs concerning th ese  two nuclear-laden th rea ts . More 
specifically, the  likelihood of nuclear diffusion could very well depend  on w hether 
th e s e  two previous ex tem al nuclear th rea ts  a re  effectively mitigated.
During the  Cold W ar, the  United S ta te s  w as the region 's primary instrument 
of mitigation. American extended deterrence w as applied to Northeast Asia in order 
to  d e te r  "the Soviet Union... from threatening  a reas  perceived vital to American 
interests."”  T he United S ta tes  reflected this interest in N ortheast Asia by signing 
m utual security treaties with th ree  key regional actors: the  Mutual Security T reaty
William T. Tow, Eacountering the Dominant Plaver; U.S. Extended Deterrent Strategy 
in the Asia-Pacific. Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1991, p. 2.
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with Japan; the  Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea; and, the  Mutual 
Defense Treaty with Taiwan. As of 1994, only the security treaties with South Korea 
and  Jap an  remain a s  the  security treaty with Taiwan w as formally revoked in 1979.
The problem  for the  region is that A m erica’s  post-Cold W ar commitment is 
som ew hat uncertain. C urrent regional military comm itm ents, for example, 
represent "only 17 percent of U.S. military m anpow er...allocated to  Asia, and only 
about 6 percent is deployed forward in the  region; and of that 6 percent, 70 percent 
of those deployed fonward a re  in Jap an  and Korea."’̂  While the formal commitment 
h a s  yet to shift from "substance to symbol,’”® th e  United S ta te s  could one day 
decide to withdraw its mitigating capabilities from the  region.
A c onsequence  of the  withdrawal of th e  American comm itm ent and  nuclear 
um brella would b e  to force both Ja p an  and  South Korea to exam ine the  strategic 
value of nuclear deterrence. At th e  very least, uncertainty over th e  future of U.S. 
mitigation may explain why regional military expenditures have consistently grown 
since 1990. Furthermore, the  implications derived form an  examination of regional 
potential becom e that much m ore significant if one considers the  effects on military 
growth that could follow a full Am erican withdrawal.
While U.S. mitigation is critical to evaluating the  region's susceptibility, it is 
still essential to consider w here conflict would a rise  betw een the  regional actors.
*= Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," International Securitv. vol. 18, no. 
3, Winter 1993/94, p. 50.
Ibid-p. 51.
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Clearly, mitigation se rv es  to alleviate threat, but it implies th a t there  is substantial 
th reat in th e  first place. In the  c a s e  of N ortheast Asia, a  num ber of d isputes 
se rv e  to skew  perceptions and  add  to susceptibility. T h e se  issu es  of marked 
disagreem ent m ay a lso be the b e s t indicators of why conflict will arise and  betw een 
who an  expected  conflict would b e  betw een; (See: Table 15.):
Table 15. Sovereignty. Legitimacy, and Territorial Conflicts in Northeast Asia
* Com peting Russian and  J a p a n e se  claims to th e  S outhern Kurile 
islands.
* The d ispute  betw een Sou th  Korea and Ja p an  over th e  Liancourt 
Rocks in th e  southern part of the  S e a  of Jap an .
* Divided sovereignty over th e  Korean peninsula.
* Competing sovereignty claims of the C hinese reg im es on m ainland 
China and  Taiwan.
* The unresolved dispute betw een Ja p an  and China over Senkaku 
islands in th e  East China S ea .
Source: International_Securitv. vol. 18, no.3. 1993 
The breakdow n for e ach  regional actor is a s  follows:
* J a p a n  - Involved in four d isputes over islands, two with South 
Korea, one with China, an d  one with Russia.
’ S o u th  K orea - Involved in two disputes. O ne over offshore islands, 
the other, an ex isten tial th rea t posed to the  s ta te  by a  nuclear arm ed 
North Korea.
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* Taiw an - Confronted by a  numerically superior nuclear adversary  
that officially considers Taiwan part of m ainland China. Taiwan clearly 
fac e s  an  ex is ten tia l th reat to the  state.
* C hina - D isputes with Jap an  and Taiwan.
* North K orea - Facing an ex is ten tia l th rea t to th e  s ta te  from the  
United S ta te s  and South Korea.
In three of th e  above  c a ses : North Korea; South Korea; and  Taiwan; each  
acto r confronts a  possible existential threat to  national security. This form of 
external th rea t is significant, should it arise, a s  it ad d s to susceptibility, and 
contributes to the  probability for nuclear diffusion. In order to further evaluate the  
ex tent of susceptibility, e ach  actors' operating milieu a s  It is perceived by the  s ta te  
is independently exam ined. The examination will p roceed  by first exploring the 
perceptions held by South Korea.
Northeast Asia:_South Korea
The Korean arm istice of 1953 w as supposed  to have ended  all hostilities 
betw een the two Koreas. T he threat from North Korea, however, persists even into 
the  post-Cold W ar era. S ince 1968, North Korea can b e  credited with repeated  acts 
of outright aggression  or of undertaking actions perceived a s  hostile: (See: Table 
16):
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Table 16. Incidents of Aggression by North Korea
1968 - A ssassination  attem pt ag a in st th e  South Korean President.
1968 - Seizing of the  U.S. Pueblo.
1974 - A ssassination a ttem pt on ROK President Park Chung H ee - leading 
to the  m urder of his wife.
1983 - The m urder of key cab inet officials in an o th er presidential 
a ssassination  attem pt a t  Rangoon. Burma.
1987 - Korean Airlines airp lane bombing.
1950/?-The digging of num erous infiltration tunnels under the DMZ. 
1991/?- S u sp ec ted  atom ic w eap o n s program .
Source: Leonard Spector, "North Korea: The Next N uclear Nightmare," 
ontrol Today. M arch 1991.
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T h ese  before-mentioned incidents highlight the d eg ree  of extem al threat that 
confronts South Korea within its operating milieu. The evidence that North Korea is 
developing, or has developed, an  atom ic device only se rv e  to exace rb a te  South 
Korean fears  of th rea t.’  ̂ As su ch , th e  ill-tempered nature  of South  Korea's 
operating milieu clearly contributes to  a  high d eg ree  of susceptibility to th e  nuclear 
contagion.
B ecause  nuclear diffusion would h av e  b een  expected  under th e  deg ree  of 
existential threat, it is believed that th e  United S ta te s  comm itm ent to  South Korean 
security did successfully mitigate w hat would have otherwise been  Southern nuclear 
diffusion.’® Diffusion theory a s su m e s  that South Korea reconsiders its non-nuclear 
s ta tu s  once  the  instrument of mitigation, m eaning the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is 
rem oved. In fact, p ast South Korean interest in an  atomic w eap o n s capability did 
co m e in response  to th e  proposed withdrawal of all Am erican forces from South 
Korea in the  1970s:
See: Leonard Specter's and Jacqueline Smith's, "North Korea: The Next Nuclear 
Nightmare?" Arms Control Today. 1991; and David Sanger's, "Jittery Asia Has Visions of a Nuclear 
North Korea," New York Times. April 7, 1991.
It unquestionable that the presence of the United States has stymied South Korean 
diffusion. For example, it was stated at a 1979 Senate Armed Services Committee meeting, that a 
proposed reduction in the American commitment that would increase (South) Korean pressure to 
develop nuclear weapons of their own. In addition, the American presence within the peninsula is 
also credited for inciting the North Korean atomic weapons program and ensuring that a South 
Korean atomic program would be the final consequence of any American withdrawal form the 
peninsula. Please see: Peter Hayes, ^gfic_EQwderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea. New 
York: Lexington Books. 1990. p. 201-216.
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...in 1971 P resident Park Chun H ee ordered th e  W eapons 
Exploitation Com m ittee to  explore obtaining nuclear w eapons. He 
took  this m ove in reaction to  th e  Nixon withdrawal of the  Seventh  
Infantry Division from South Korea in early 1971.’®
South Korea nuclear diffusion is quite probable if the Am erican comm itm ent 
is ev er withdrawn while North Korea is still an  existential th r e a t . A rough estim ate  
su g g ests  that South Korea would acquires a  nuclear device in nine m onths after the  
final political decision is m ade  to do s o .’  ̂The probability of South Korean diffusion, 
how ever, still dep en d s on w hether th e  U.S. rem ains the mitigator of its nuclear 
fea rs . Considering th e  existential nature  of the  North Korean nuclear threat, it 
se e m s  probable, according to th e  logic of nuclear diffusion, that South  Korea will 
acquire nuclear w eapons once  the  U.S. nuclear um brella is rem oved.
Korea: North Korea
Until his death in 1994, Kim il Sung firmly g overned  over North Korea. Kim 
Jong  il, the  son of Sung, h as  since replaced his fether a s  Party S ecre ta ry  G eneral, 
of th e  Korean W orkers Party (KWP). In all likelihood, Jong il will follow the  sa m e  
governing tenets that guided S ung 's  tenure. T h ese  ten e ts  include: (1) th e  survival
Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg; American Nuclear Dilemma in Korea. New York: 
Lexington Books. 1990, p. 204.
Bad. p. 211.
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of What is now the  Kim Jong il regim e; (2) to further all s te p s  which will lead to 
reunification; (3) to ensure  North Korean independence: and, (4) to g en era te  
support for econom ic developm ent and  military m odernization.’® For North Korea, 
it is th e  Southern alliance betw een a  nuclear-arm ed U. S. and  an  economically 
superior South Korea that rep resen ts  th e  existential threat.
The security dilemma faced by North Korea, a  dilemma accen tua ted  by the  
lo ss  of th e  Soviet Union a s  both an  ally and benefector, is the  econom ic and 
technological superiority of the  South.’® In addition, the  loss of the  Soviet Union that 
accounted for over 45% of D R P K trade,^  China’s  1993 decision to  recognize South 
Korea, and the disparity in the  num ber of s ta te s  th a t recognize and cooperate  with 
only South  Korea,®’ merely add  to North K orea's isolation and  its perceptions of 
insecurity. T he perception of disparity is further intensified by North Korea's own 
persisten t econom ic m alaise that h as  contributed to  a  58.1 percent decline in 
military expenditures: (See: Table: 10). The effect of this decline is further 
a ccen tua ted  by South Korea's im pressive econom ic and military growth (See: 
T ab les 10., 11., and 12).
Norman D. Levin, "Global Detente and North Korea's Strategic Relations," The Korean 
Peninsula, ed. William J. Taylor, Jr. and Cha Young-Koo, and John Q. Blodgett. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1990, p. 96.
Ibid. p. 45.
-  Ibid. p. 46.
-- As stated in the 1988 Book of Nations, 122 governments recognize the ROK, whereas 103 
recognize the DRPK,
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B ecause of South Korea’s  improving military capabilities, it is anticipated that 
"North Korea's offensive capability will b e  severely  diminished in com parison to the  
South 's" own offensive capability by 2000.®® From 1990 to 1993 alone. North 
Korea's total d efense budget declined by 58.1%  while South Korea's increased  by 
13.6%: (S ee: Table 10.). In addition, future diminution in military expenditures 
should continue since the North Korean econom y has declined a t a  substantial rate 
sin ce  1990. Once the nuclear and conventional might of the  United S ta te s  is 
factored into North Korea’s  security equation, it is obvious why nuclear emulation 
w as viewed a s  a  viable alternative to  future vulnerability.
For North Korea, a nuclear w eapons capability provides the  essential m eans 
to elim inate "the thorny problem of estim ating p resen t and  future strengths" of 
enem ies th a t a re  already arm ed with n uclear weapons.®® The probability of North 
Korean diffusion dep en d s on w hether th e  se rie s  of recent diplomatic initiatives by 
th e  United S ta te s  a re  successful a t stalling its atomic w eap o n s program.®^ The 
g rea test likelihood is that North Korea rem ains an  op aq u e  nuclear w eap o n s sta te  
until an outbreak of hostilities with the Sou thern  alliance. For that m atter, opacity
“  Young Coo Cha, "North Korea," The Future oTSouth Korean and U.S. Securitv Relations. 
ed. William J. Taylor, Jr., Young Coo Cha, and John Q. Blodgett. Boulder: Westview Press. 1990. 
p. 103.
“  Waltz (1979), O P. cit.. p. 73.
Year-long talks between the U.S. and DRPK which had sought to finalize an agreement 
that would have exchanged North Korea's GCR-type reactors for enriched uranium reactors 
collapsed in early 1995. Hease See: "Keeping Nuclear Order," The Washington Post vol. 12. no. 34. 
April 17-23, 1995. p. 6-12-
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should prevail up until the  tim e it is perceived by North Korean leadersh ip  that the 
s ta te 's  ex istence is in direct jeopardy. Short of such  a threat, opacity se rv es  the 
in te rests  of security since a  North Korean nuclear capability could a t b est only 
preserve th e  s ta te  from total defeat.
For North Korea, nuclear w eapons would not help in the pursuit of actual 
military aim s, a s  to utilize th e  w eapon would invite an  ovenvhelming American 
nuclear response. However, a  North Korean nuclear w eapons capability m ay deter 
the  U.S. from a nuclear first strike; a s  to do so could invite an atomic resp o n se  by 
the  North K oreans aga inst the  South. While this m ay seem  illogical given the 
enorm ous differences in the  size and quality of th e  respective nuclear arsenals, the 
North K oreans a re  presently  capable of striking Seoul, and  a num ber of other 
Southem  cities. The question is would South Korea support an American first strike 
against the  North, in light of a  North Korean retaliatory capability? North Korea, in 
o ther words, do es  not require a  large o r analogous nuclear a rsenal to achieve 
deterrence within its milieu. Rather, even  a  few su sp ec ted  nuclear w eap o n s could 
deter the  next conflict from ever going nuclear. As a  result, nuclear w eapons would 
have served  to reaffirm the  ex istence of th e  s ta te  and  the Jong il regime.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Japan
Ja p an 's  strategic concerns revolve mainly around econom ics and the degree 
to which the  dom estic econom y endures an  unhealthy d eg ree  of vulnerability that 
follows from its d e p e n d en c e  on foreign actors. Specifically, J a p a n 's  econom ic 
prosperity d epends entirely on the export of m anufactured goods and  the  import of 
raw m aterials. D ependence stem s from Ja p an 's  dearth  in natural reso u rces. As a 
result, Jap an  m ust accep t an unhealthy vulnerability a s  it m ust import 87.66%  of its 
coal; 99.72%  of its oil; and 100.00% of its nickel, bauxite, and  m agnesium . 
Geographically, 47.13%  of th e s e  resources a re  imported from the  Indian O cean 
Basin, with ano ther 35.99%  from the Pacific Rim.®®
In resp o n se  to this vulnerability, J a p a n 's  stra teg y  h as  b een  to targ e t a 
num ber of regional trad ing-states for both capital investm ent and  econom ic 
assistance.®® The objective of this strategy w as to le sse n  vulnerability by fostering 
g rea te r  interdependence.®^ Econom ic vulnerability, however, rep resen ts  only one
George Friedman, and Meredith Labored, The Coming War with Japan. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 1991, p. 172.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry sees its role as coordinator of a newly 
emerging structure of subcontractor economies in Southeast Asia. Please see: Karl Van Wolferen, " 
The Japan Problem Revisited," Foreign Affairs. 1990. p. 48. See also: Sam Jameson, "Japan's New 
Sphere of Power," The Los Angeles Times; World Report August 1, 1995. p. HI.
Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Foreign Policy in East Asia," Current Historv. December 1992,
p. 407.
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a sp ec t of Ja p an 's  national security problem.
There exist within J ap an 's  security milieu quite traditional military threats. The 
difficulty for Ja p an  is that responding to such th rea ts is complicated by dom estic 
obstac les. W hat is believed to prevent Jap an  from becom ing a  military power is 
Article IX of the constitution and a  d efen se  budget fixed to 1% of GNP.®® The m ost 
important question is how the interpretation of Article IX affects J a p a n 's  military 
strength;
Aspiring sincerely to an  international p eace  b ased  on justice and 
order, the Ja p an e se  people forever renounce war a s  a  sovereign right 
of th e  nation and  th e  th reat or u se  of force a s  m ea n s  of settling 
intemational disputes. In order to accomplish the  aim of the  preceding 
paragraph, land, sea , and  air forces, as  well a s  other w ar potential, 
will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the  s ta te  will not 
be  recognized.®®
The official interpretation of Article IX w as that the  constitutional restriction 
pertained only to the acquisition and u se  of offensive weapons."®^ As a result. Article 
IX perm itted th e  developm ent of defensive capabilities. Defensive military 
capabilities, however, can  not be simply distinguished from offensive capabilities.
Peter J. Katzenstein, and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security," Intemational 
Securitv. vol. 17, no. 4, Spring 1993, p. 840.
John E. Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option; Political. Technical, and Strategic Factors. New 
York: Praeger. 1975, p. 41.
Ibid. p. 42.
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In any event, the  p resen t interpretation of Article IX did not prevent th e  acquisition 
of military capabilities. As a  result, Jap an  is not a s  military w eak a s  one would 
h av e  presum ed. Instead, a  large GNP h as  perm itted Ja p a n  to expand its 
"defensive" capabilities even with a  1 % fixed military budget. In o ther words, Jap an  
h as  "already rearm ed" itself; (S ee: Table 14.).^"'
The growth in Jap an 's  military expenditures h a s  persisted  for d ecad es . For 
exam ple, th e  d e fen se  budget from 1971 through 1986 increased  by over 139 
p e r c e n t .S i n c e  1989, J a p a n 's  d e fen se  budget increased  from $29.6  billion to 
alm ost $40 billion in 1993. In com parison to o ther nation-sta tes, J a p a n 's  total 
military budget w as third in 1989, and  second only to the  U.S. by 1994.®^ Clearly, 
neither Article IX nor a  1% GNP/Defense budget ratio prevented substantial growth 
in Jap an 's  military budget. Instead, sizeable expenditures have provided Jap an  with 
"a very, very potent military."^ For that matter, Ja p an 's  conventional capabilities 
a re  already  recognized by Am erican military officials a s  powerful by any military 
standard.^^ The question that rem ains to be addressed , however, is w hether Jap an  
will ever supplem ent its conventional capabilities with nuclear w eapons.
Friedman, and Lebard, op. cit.. p. 328.
Kiyofuku Chuma, "Spending More on Defense," World Press Review. April 1989. p. 19,
”  Chuma, op. cit. p. 19. See also: The Military Balance 1994-1995. London: Brassey's.
Sam Jameson, "A Reluctant Superpower Agonizes Over Military," The Los Angeles Times: 
World Report. August 1, 1995. p. H4.
IbiiL
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Ja p an  is believed to have not acquired a  d eclared  nuclear w eapons 
capability b ecau se  of the  obstacles of Article IX and the anti-military norm s p resen t 
within th e  g eneral public.^ This nuclear inhibition w as asso c ia ted  with a  cultural 
allergy that d a te s  to 1945 and th e  atomic a ttacks a t Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Ja p an 's  declared  non-nuclear sta tus, or Kaku von S eisaku  (Four Nuclear 
Principles), w as announced  a s  firm governm ent policy in 1968. T hese  four nuclear 
principles declared: "(1) The T hree Non-Nuclear Principles (not to  m anufacture, 
p o ssess , or allow the  importation of nuclear w eapons); (2) support of efforts toward 
international nuclear disarm am ent; (3) accep tan ce  of th e  nuclear deterren t power 
of th e  United S ta tes ; and , (4) support of peaceful u se  of nuclear energy."^^ 
Notwithstanding, neither th e  four principles, nor Article IX, prohibit Jap an  from 
acquiring the so-called essential means for self-defense. Therefore, the  question of 
w hether Jap an  could be a  nuclear w eapons s ta te  revolves around the  conception 
of th e  nuclear w eapon. Specifically, is it an  offensive w eapon u sed  for military 
purposes, or a  defensive w eapon utilized to d e te r  war?
A nuclear w eapon is first and forem ost a  defensive w eapon based  on 
offensive capability. Nuclear deterrence deters since th e  u se  of such w eapons a re  
indefensible, and  its destructive co n seq u en ces  a re  dram atic. W hat the  atomic 
bom b rep resen ts, therefore, is a  "defensive" militarily capability quite permissible
Katzenstein, and Okawara, op. cit. p. 840. 
Endicott, op. cit.. p. 45.
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under the  p resen t interpretation of Article IX.
The removal of th e  obstacle posed  by Article IX would su g g e s t th a t Ja p an 's  
future nuclear s ta tu s  is not a s  fixed a s  som e would previously h ave  believed. 
Rather, Jap an 's  n u c lear s ta tu s  should be  viewed a s  an  political aversion that may 
change  to reflect ex ternal conditions. Diffusion theory would further a rgue  that 
cultural or constitutional obstacles can not prevent Jap an  from becom ing a  nuclear 
w eapons s ta te  o nce  its relative security is sufficiently th rea tened  by a  nuclear­
arm ed power.
Jap an 's  p ast political actions seem  to reflect an  apparen t understanding that 
nuclear sta tus m ay n eed  to som eday  change. C oncerns over future security w ere 
com m unicated, for instance, in th e  political discussions that surrounded  Ja p an 's  
en trance into the  original NPT treaty. The actual ratification of th e  original NPT 
would follow in 1976.^® More recently, similar voices of res is tan ce  w ere  m ade  in 
internal d e b a te s  concerning the support of an indefinite ex tension  of th e  NPT 
beyond 1995.®® T h e se  ap p rehensions reflect the  position th a t an  indefinite 
extension of the  NPT could "tie th e  han d s of future governm ents in Tokyo if new 
security th rea ts arise."^° The concern m ay also indicate m isgivings over th e  
over the  reliability of forever conjoining Ja p an e se  national security  with the
Endicott, op. cit. p. 101-102.
Harrison, op^cit. p. 23. Please note: Japan did vote in favor of the indefinite expansion 
of the treaty.
Harrison, op. cit. p. 23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1 7
American nuclear umbrella.
During the final years of th e  Cold War, there w as definite public skepticism  
within Ja p an  concerning th e  credibility of th e  American nuclear guaran tee. For 
exam ple, o n e  public opinion poll in 1989 stated  that over 47%  "expressed  little 
confidence in the  U.S. nuclear umbrella."^’ W here political and  security  relations 
m ay begin to wither, however, is over th e  effects of rep ea ted  trad e  conflicts.
During 1995, trade  negotiations betw een the  two s ta te s  had  collapsed and  
th rea ts of sanctions w ere m ade against Japan.'*® The indirect implication for national 
security is that perennial U.S. d em an d s m ade "in the context of th e  bilateral trade 
conflict ab e t the proliferation of nationalistic sentim ent... [against th e  United 
States],"^® and could eventually impinge upon the security relationship. Specifically, 
increasing w eak n ess  in th e  political relationship could force Ja p an  to reconsider 
w hether the  U.S. is a reliable guarantor.
The d egree of susceptibility and mitigation are  the  n ecessa ry  conditions for 
determining w hether J a p an  becom es a  nuclear w eapons-sta te . If th e  confidence 
in the  American nuclear umbrella declines during a  period in which Ja p an  confronts 
a  nuclear threat, nuclear sta tus will be reconsidered. As such, J a p an 's  non-nuclear 
s ta tu s  should not be  thought of a s  fixed, since acquisition of nuclear w eapons would
Tow, op. cit... p. 103.
Leslie Helm, Sanctions Loom as U.S.^apan Trade Talks Stall," The Los Angeles Times. 
May 6, 1995. p. A l.
"*® Karen van Wolferen, "The Japan Problem Relisted," Foreign Affairs. 1991, p. 51.
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com e in resp o n se  to th e  d em an d s em placed  by a  new  strategic environm ent. As 
Hisahiko Okazaki, th e  former Ja p a n e s e  am b assad o r to Thailand, sta ted . Jap an  
would becom e a  nuclear w eap o n s s ta te  for th e  sa k e  of national security:
"If J a p a n 's  survival w ere  a t  s tak e  ... b e c au se  of a  threat from the 
R u ssians, the  North K oreans or the  C hinese (Japan  could build a  
strong military force for itself.) If J a p an  had to do everything (for its 
own defense) it would go  nuclear. T hat would com e form necessity, 
not from so m e revival of militarism."**
W hat m ust not be presum ed is that J a p an  is immune from the nuclear 
contagion b ecau se  of cultural, historical, or constitutional reasons. Forty-five y ea rs  
of nuclear inhibitions can be  b e s t explained by Am erican mitigation of Ja p an 's  
extem al nuclear threats. However, a s  uncertainty and susceptibility esca la tes , and  
a s  the  value of mitigation of plummets, the probability of nuclear diffusion increases.
Simply put, the  future of the  Am erican commitment, and  the rise of the  North 
K orean threat, m ay soon  te s t J a p a n 's  post-Cold W ar nuclear inhibitions.
Ja p an 's  g rea te st post-Cold W ar fear is that "a unified Korea will go nuclear 
w hether or not North Korea can  b e  persuaded  to give up its nuclear option.'"*® T he 
fea r  over North Korea increased  in Ju n e  of 1993 w hen North Korea test- fired its
Selig Harrison, "Japan's Second Thoughts About Nuclear Weapons," The Washington 
, November 8-14, 1993, p. 24.
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m ost cap ab le  ballistic missile, th e  Rodong-1.'*® The d istress over North K orea 's 
nuc lear capability will continue in the  future since  the  recent ag reem ent m ad e  to 
stym ie its nuclear w eap o n s program  did not rem ove th e  latent capability.
T he ag reem en t with North Korea will only rep lace a  plutonium producing 
heavy-w ater reactor with a  light-water facility. A s a  result. North K orea's latent 
w eapons capability w as not affected since th e  ability to  exploit th e  w eap o n s option 
is only complicated by replacing one reactor type with another.*® Ja p an  m ust then  
confront a nuclear w eapons-capab le  s ta te  that its own officials say  it "can not 
trust."*® The final issu e  needing to be  a d d re sse d  is w hether Jap an  can in fact go 
nuclear should it h av e  to.
Jap an  is, without doubt, a  latent nuclear w eapons power. A British D efense  
Ministry report m ade  public in 1994 sta ted  th at Ja p an  has "all the  e lem en ts 
n ecessary  to  build a  nuclear bomb."*® Kazua Aichi, Ja p an 's  former D efense Minister, 
claimed in 1994 th at J a p an  w as quite cap ab le  of producing a  nuclear w eapon if it 
so  chose.®® Furthermore, the  previous review of J ap an 's  civilian-related capabilities
Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," Asian Survey vol. 
XXXIV. no. 5. May 1994. p. 437.
For further clarification one can address the points made in chapter five concerning a 
civilian nuclear power capability and a nuclear weapons option.
David E. Sanger, "Japan Denies Any Plans to Build Nuclear Bombs," The New York 
Times. February 2, 1994, p. AS.
Sam Jameson, "We Should Not Possess These Weapons," ]
1994. p. A 14.
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m ake it c lear that a  latent option is readily available for exploitation.®’
China
T he analysis  of China beg ins with an  em p h asis  upon its econom ic growth 
over the  last d ecad es . China's econom ic growth av eraged  6.8 percent from 1965- 
1980.®® From  1980 to 1990, yearly growth in GNP averaged  9.5 percent.®® 
Expansion  in the  th ree  secto rs  of th e  econom y, primary, secondary, and tertiary, 
increased  10 percent in 1993.®* This economic growth is important a s  it Hieled both 
increased  d e fe n se  spending  and  military m odernization.
C hina's d efen se  spending increased  by 20.6%  since 1990 {See: Table 10). 
T he 1994 d e fen se  budget is estim ated anywhere from an  official Chinese es tim ate  
of 5 billion (U.S. dollars) to the  Pen tagon 's  estim ate  of 40 billion.®® The pursuit of 
military m odernization, for exam ple, led China to approve for 1995 a  "15 p ercen t
The review of Japan’s capabilities led to the conclusion that it was nuclear weapons- 
capable. This conclusion was based on the evidence that Japan has surpassed all the critical rungs in 
the phasal ladder. These capabilities included; plutonium-producing reactors; reprocessing 
capabilities; enrichment facilities; and SLV-Iaunch vehicles.
Waltz (1993), ûiLjâL, p. 68.
" IbisL
®® Nayan Chanda, "Fear of the Dragon," Far Eastern Economic Review. April 13, 1995. p.
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increase  in its d efen se  budget."®® This sizeable military growth is a lso  consistent 
with C hina 's desire  for regional power through greater military strength relative to 
its salient others.®^
China's quest for military strength reflects a  long-standing strategic goal "to 
successfu lly  estab lish  a national-military industrial b a se  sufficiently formidable to 
neutralize potentially serious military th rea ts  posed to  Beijing by the superpow ers 
or by o th er regional actors."®® T he specific strategy for dealing with all extemal 
th rea ts  changed  in 1978, with the  adoption of the "People 's W ar Under Modern 
Conditions" (PWUMC), in which the post-Mao leadership sought to redress 
emerging disparities in capabilities betw een China and its various extem al threats.®® 
T h ese  external th rea ts  include: (1) a  direct attack on the C h inese hom eland; (2) 
stra teg ic  intimidation by the  superpow ers; and, (3) "potential th reats" originating 
from regional actors.®® China's perception of the post-Cold W ar milieu is still one of 
the  s ta te  being surrounded by num erous adversaries.
Unfortunately, China's perception of its environment indicates concern over
Cameron W. Barr, and Sheila Teft, "Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab," The 
Christian Science Monitor. March 17,1995. p. 6..
Projected acquisition of an aircraft carrier, improvements in principal surface combatants, 
fighters jets, merely complements an apparent desire to establish forward naval ports in the Indian 
Ocean using islands contracted from Burma. See: Nicholas D. Kristoff, "The Rise of China," Foreign 
Affairs, 1993. p. 66-67.
Tow, op,jcit. p. 195.
Bzid. p. 198.
«° Bad- p. 198.
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th reats  which exist in every geographic direction. Specifically, a  hostile and nuclear­
arm ed India is to  the  west; a  nuclear-armed R ussia  is to the  north; a  latent nuclear­
arm ed Taiwan and Ja p a n  a re  to the  e ast; a  nuclear-arm ed United S ta tes is to the  
far east; and a  Vietnam is to the south. Perceptions of th e  milieu a re  also affected 
by p ast nuclear threats m ade by the  U.S., and  the  p resen ce  of other nuclear-armed 
powers. Given this operating milieu, it s e em s reasonab le  why China would se e k  to 
u se  its newfound econom ic wealth to au g m en t its nuclear and  conventional 
capabilities.
China boldly m ade  clear its desire  to  improve nuclear capabilities by 
conducting rep ea ted  international atom ic te s ts  in 1993, 1994, and  1995.®’ The 
im portance of atom ic testing for China is th a t can  a ss is t  in the  qualitative 
improvement of nuclear arsenal.®® N evertheless, China's nuclear actions endanger 
regional stability by alarming o ther s ta te s  which view her a s  a  salient other. 
P ercep tions of China a s  a  possible a g g resso r m ay have a lso  b een  reaffirmed in 
1995 by its se izu re  of a  South China reef claimed by the  Philippines.®®
C hina's recen t actions could help skew  o ther actors' perceptions, and m ay 
raise the susceptibility of a  state that considers China a s  a  salient other. The action
Leonard S. Specter, and Evan S. Medeiros, "China's Perilous Nuclear Puzzle," The 
Washington Post. October 11-17, 1993. p. 25.
A NWS-state would only conduct testing in a desire to improve the qualitative nature of 
its nuclear arsenal. Specifically, China may be actively pursuing a MIRV capability, or wishing to 
miniaturize its nuclear weapons arsenal.
Barr and Tefft. op. cit. p. 6.
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against the  Philippines further su g g ests  that a  regional waterw ay, th e  South China 
S e a , is a lready a t risk to C hina 's em erging ability to project military power. 
M oreover, the  Philippine action could be  perceived a s  C hina's d esire  to  establish 
a  territorial prerogative over disputed islands and  possibly the  region a s  a  whole.®* 
Consequently, China's actions m ay be helping to  prom ote the very conditions that 
will com pel other s ta te s  to subsequen tly  "go nuclear."
Taiwan
T he primary th rea t to Taiwan is th e  existential th rea t posed  by a  nuclear­
arm ed China. The th reat posed  by China is th a t it h as  yet to rescind its claim over 
the  islands of Taiwan.®® Deng Xiaoping, the  national leader of China, claimed in the 
m id-1980s th at the  s ta te  would respond with military force should Taiw an attempt 
any of th e  following:
...If Taipei decided to build nuclear w eapons; if Taipei claim ed to be 
an  independent sta te ; if Taipei lost internal control...if Taipei 
continued to reject unification...
The seizure of a Philippine-claimed reef serves to reaffirm concerns held by Vietnam, 
Indonesia, and Japan, that China is seeking to establish control over disputed islands and valuable 
waterways. As well, the timing of the action, in a period in which China is growing at unprecedented 
rate both militarily and economically, seems to communicate an added intention for greater regional 
prominence through force if necessary. Please see: Nayan Chanda, "Territorial Imperative," Far 
Eastern Economic Review. February 23, 1$>95. p. 14-16.
Tow O P. cit.. p. 260.
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An instance of C h inese aggression  is not without historical precedent. 
Hostilities erupted with m ainland China in 1955 and  1957-58. During this time, 
Taiwan enjoyed a blanket of security provided by a  mutual treaty  with th e  United 
S ta te s . This security relationship contributed to two instances in which the  "U.S. 
cam e very close to transform ing nuclear d e terrence into th e  actual com bat u se  of 
nuclear w eapons" against China.®® The formal security relationship ended in 1978, 
however, when President C arter chose  to forsake diplomatic and security relations 
with Taiwan in order to en courage further relations with China.®® T he removal of the 
American security blanket forced Taiwan to adopt an  ag g ress iv e  self-help posture 
since, a s  P resident Lee Teng-hui stated, the  C h inese th reat and Taiwan's 
geographic  position m ake national security th e  "root of all prosperity...and if there  
is no security, there  is nothing."®®
Self-help clearly encouraged Taiwan to reconsider its relative military power 
position in light of the  C hinese threat. The evaluation by Taiwan led it to conclude 
that its military capabilities had approached o b so lescence a s  of 1980.®® In response, 
Taiwan utilized American technological transfers, and  large currency reserves, in
 ̂ Tow op. cit.. p. 63.
’ Ibid.
® Hickey op. cit. p. 107.
Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties. Praeger Publishers: 
Westport Connecticut. 1994, p. 47.
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order to m odernize and  improve the  military. T he post-1980 em phasis on improving 
military capabilities led to  the  developm ent an d  p u rch ase  of advanced  fighter 
aircraft, anti-subm arine helicopters, defense fighters, the  PFG -2 missile frigate, and 
a  variety of advanced  surface-to-surface, air-to-air, and  anti-ship missiles.®® Still, 
Tahwan's improved conventional capability m ay only provide a  tem porary d e fen se  
against the  more formidable C hinese capabilities. A s a  result, exploiting th e  latent 
nuclear w eapons option could prove the final recourse  should direct aggression  by 
China seem  imminent.
T aiw an's p o ssess io n  of a  latent nuclear w eap o n s option is already 
undeniable.®’ Given the  s ta te 's  existential vulnerability, for example, diffusion theory 
a s su m e s  that Taiwan would choose to becom e a  nuclear w eapons s ta te  a s  it lacks 
a  gu aran to r that could successfully  mitigate th e  th rea t posed  by China.®^ Since 
inviting a  Chinese a ttack  is undesired, Taiwan is likely to remain an opaque  nuclear 
power until an  explicit th rea t aga inst the  s ta te  d o e s  arise.®®
Ibid. p. 109.
Ibid. p. 109-
It was estimated in 1982 that even then a Taiwanese nuclear weapons option would be 
within three years, if it had not already achieved such a capability.
One recent book on the Chinese threat to Taiwan has suggested that a Chinese invasion 
is most likely between 1995-1997. During this time, national elections it is believed may tax Taiwan's 
ability to defend itself. Please See: Cheng Lang-ping, _
Taiwan.
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A Summary
An analysis of N ortheast Asia su g g e st that even a s  th e  Cold W ar becom es 
part of history an  equally dangerous regional structure of anarchy  h as  begun to 
em erge. T he region's expenditures and perceptions portray an  im age of actors that 
a re  concerned  with security. Furthermore, a  review of the  milieu indicates that 
perceptions a re  sensitive to the implications of the actions of nuclear-arm ed salient 
o thers. Furtherm ore, th ese  a re  salient o thers which in so m e c a se s , like within 
Korea and  Taiwan, face  a  direct threat to th e  very ex istence of th e  sta te .
The perceptions of nuclear th rea t posed  by both China and  North Korea 
could lead to the dynamic in which nuclear diffusion infects certain actors, if not the 
entire region. Therefore, if preventing regional proliferation is a  goal, it entails that 
the  international community is willing to adopt specific policies designed  to prevent 
th e  phenom ena of nuclear diffusion.
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Chapter 8: Prevention and Policy Options
Presen t nonproliferation policies a re  designed  to hinder an  initial and isolated 
ac t of proliferation instead  of th e  dynam ic of nuclear diffusion. T he architects of 
th e s e  nonproliferation policies ignored why th e  ac t of proliferation results and the  
co n seq u en ces  that follow from proliferation. In making distinctions betw een the act 
and  th e  consequence  of proliferation, be tte r policies should b e  ab le  to be 
constructed  to prevent th e  dynam ic of nuclear diffusion.
NoPzdiffusion; Choices in Policy
O ver the past d ecad es , th e  United S ta tes , with som e o ther nations and 
various international organizations, h a s  taken  the primary initiative to  promote the 
norm of nonproliferation. Law rence S cheinm an, an  advisor to the  Atlantic Council 
Think Tank, stated, that "virtually every initiative towards this end - th e  Baruch Plan, 
Atoms for P eace, establishm ent of the  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
th e  Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), th e  Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - w as the
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c o n seq u e n c e  of U.S. initiative.'” Such nonproliferation policies, however, will not 
prevent th e  dynamic of nuclear diffusion.
M ost of the current non-proliferation m easu res  focus on supply-side 
controls. Specifically, the  strategy is to limit the  ac ce ss  to the  essential m eans with 
which a  sta te  would construct a  nuclear device. Yet, a  supply-side strategy can, a t 
best, only prolong the period in which it tak e s  a  NNW S-state to acquire a  latent 
nuclear w eapons option. For nonproliferation policies to be effective they m ust 
move aw ay from the fixation on technological denial, and recognize that proliferation 
a nd  nuclear diffusion is b est prevented  by mitigating th e  susceptibility a  NNWS- 
s ta te  h a s  to the  nuclear contagion. Accordingly, th ree  interdependent stra teg ies 
a re  proposed to mitigate nuclear diffusion:
1. The Continuing Support for the Nonproliferation 
norm.
2. The Strengthening and Endorsement o f Security Guarantees.
3. A Strategy of Promoting Regional Cooperation.
Multilateral and Unilateral Instruments of Control
The historical effort of nonproliferation h as  b een  to control the  technical
■* Lawrence Scheinman, "Non-proliferation, International Security and U.S. Interests," The 
■Atlantic Council of the United States. December Policy Statement 1992.
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s p read  of nuclear w eapons-m aking capabilities. Such supply-side controls have 
b een  the  cen terp iece of the  nonproliferation regim e. The regim e, however, w as 
ineffectual a s  it willfully permitted th e  proliferation of latent capabilities.
The spread  of dual-use technologies limits the  effectiveness that any supply- 
s id e  stra tegy  could have against proliferation. Realistically, a  supply-side control 
c an  only com plicate the  path tow ards the nuclear option. A supply-side strategy  
would only prove effective, if all a c ce ss  w as p revented  to  Rungs 1 through R ungs 
5 along the  phasal ladder. N evertheless, while the  regim e m ay have failed to  
prevent a  proliferation of capabilities, it d oes retain a symbolic importance.
The nonproliferation regime w as intent on establishing and reinforcing an  
international norm ag a in st horizontal proliferation. T he ad d ed  goal of the regime, 
aside  from technical denial, w as to inhibit overt declarations by suspec ted  second  
p h a s e  latent proliférants.® The value of the  overall norm, however, has suffered 
since it has been  continuously subjugated  by signatories and  non-signatories. As 
a  result, the  normative order h as  itself been  jeopardized:
W hat is important for a normative order, such  a s  the  non-proliferation 
regim e...is how th e  community resp o n d s to violation. W hat will 
w eaken or invalidate a normative order is failure by the community to 
respond to th e  violations by reaffirming th e  desirability of the  norm.®
- India's 1973 "peaceful nuclear explosion" being the only ‘tark exception.
® Roger Smith, "Opaque Proliferation and the Fate of the Non-Proliferation R^jme," Opaque 
Nuclear Proliferation. New York: Frank Cass and Company. 1991, p. 96.
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Clearly, for many sta te s, like th e  United S ta tes, "stopping the  sp re a d  of 
nuclear w eapons has had a  priority... but in practice o ther interests have proved to 
be  m ore pressing."* For exam ple, th e  stra teg ic  im portance of Israel influenced 
su ccessiv e  American adm inistrations to overlook a  su sp ec ted  Israeli nuclear 
a rsenal. Following th e  Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the  United S ta te s  re­
e stab lished  economic and military aid to  Pakistan  while choosing to  d isregard  its 
suspected  nuclear w eapons program. M ost recently, concerns voiced throughout 
th e  1980 's over the a lleged Iraqi nuclear program  w ere overshadow ed by an  
interest to u se  her a s  a  regional coun terbalance to Iran. In addition, C an ad a , the  
form er Soviet Union, Germany, China, Russia, an d  m any others, provided critical 
aid that assisted , if not still assisting, non-nuclear s ta te s  like India, Pakistan, South 
Africa, Iraq, Iran, in the  developm ent of a  latent nuclear w eapons option. Such 
deviations th at contravene the norm ative ten e ts  of th e  treaty seem  to  clearly 
su g g est th a t the  quality of th e  regim e a s  a  tool for nonproliferation is in question.
W hile the  current regim e h a s  proven ineffectual in preventing latent 
proliferation, it did serve to  p revent non-nuclear w eapon  s ta te s  from openly 
declaring their w eapons capability. While this accom plishm ent is not especially  
significant with respect to limiting th e  num ber of cap ab le  NN W S-states, the  
m ain tenance of a  visual threshold be tw een  nuclear and  non-nuclear s ta tu s  h a s  a t 
least tem pered  the  security concerns that would arise should a  former NN W S-state
’ Waltz (1993) OP. cit.. p. 79.
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openly  declare  its latent capability. Therefore, th e  recent support of an  indefinite 
extension of the NPT past 1995 e n su res  that one international obstacle will remain 
a g a in st open  horizontal proliferation.
The NPT regime should not be  considered, however, a s  any real impediment 
or restraint aga inst nuclear diffusion. A NNW S-state th a t is nuclear w eapons 
capable  will proliferate if and when it is strategically n ecessa ry  for relative security. 
A regime could only prevent the  dynam ic nuclear diffusion if it w as  ab le to red ress 
th e  fundam ental role that nuclear th rea t h as  within proliferation and th e  diffusion 
process.
Endorsement o£JS.e.c.urity Guarantees
Fundam entally, the  phenom ena of nuclear diffusion is contingent upon the 
relationship betw een nuclear th rea t and national security. T he act of proliferation 
is the  response undertaken by a  NN W S-state that desires "nuclear w eapons... for 
security."® Still, th e  inclination to proliferate can  be  mitigated. Put differently, a  
su b seq u en t act of horizontal proliferation is preventable if a N N W S-state's national 
security is som ehow  ensured .
A NNW S-state can be prevented from becoming a  NW S-state if it is willing 
to accep t an ex tended security g u aran tee  from ano ther NW S-state. The
® Bailey, op. cit.. p. 87.
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establishm ent of a credible extended security guarantee helps alleviate the explicit 
insecurity that is associated  with nuclear threats. In the ab sen ce  of th e  guarantee, 
the  nuclear threat would have contributed to nuclear diffusion. A s a  result, an  
ex tension  of formal security g u a ran tees  m ust be the  pillar to any  overall strategy 
th at s e e k s  to prevent future nuclear diffusion.
It is undeniable that a  NNW S-state’s  "security concerns a re  m ore likely to be 
reduced by security g u a ran tees  ex tended  by the U.S. and  other nuclear w eapons 
states."® For the  goal of nondiffusion, th e  strongest "m eans by which the  United 
S ta te s  can  p e rsu ad e  a  country to  forgo nuclear w eapons is a  g u aran tee  of 
security."® Essentially, th e  nature of th e  nuclear th reat su g g e sts  that the  only 
credible a ssu ra n c e s  can "dam pen the  security concerns that ...fosters nuclear 
proliferation" and su b seq u en t nuclear diffusion.®
T h e intrinsic value of any ex tended  guaran tee  is d ep en d en t upon the  
willingness, the capability, and th e  credibility, of the nuclear guarantor. Additionally, 
the  imperiled NNW S-state m ust believe th a t the  NW S-state is willing to deter any  
and all nuclear th reats. T he dilem ma im posed by the  ex tended deterrence-type 
security is that only five N W S-states exist to offer such g u a ran tees .
Of the five NW S-states, only the  United S tates continues to apply the nuclear
® Deutch, op. cit., p. 130.
' Waltz (1993), OP. cit.. p .  99. 
® Bailey, o p .  cit.. p .  87.
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umbrella over N N W S-states th at do  not formally com prise NATO. In contrast, the 
d e te rren ts of both G reat Britain and F rance serve  tc  com pliment the  nuclear 
umbrella that is already offered to  m ost of W estem  Europe by NATO and the  United 
S ta te s . In addition, it is unclear w hether Russia continues to  offer any nuclear 
guaran tee  to  any of its form er client s ta te s  or p resent allies. In com parison. China 
has never vocalized w hether its nuclear umbrella falls over any  o ther NNW S-state. 
Consequently, since many s ta te s  fall outside the umbrella of a  declared  NWS-state, 
e ach  NNW S-state m ust fend for their security them selves w hen they confront an 
explicit nuclear w eapons th re a t  Even the  protected s ta te s  a re  not entirely 
mitigated, however, a s  the nature of relations betw een guarantor and  guarantee  do 
change.
The value of mitigation hinges on the credibility of the deterren t offered by the 
nuclear guarantor. Such  a  security comm itm ents can  only proceed  if and w hen it 
is in the national interest of the  nuclear guarantor. The d anger for th e  guarantor is 
that an extension of security invites risk. Should an  ex tended de terren t be tested , 
for exam ple, it invokes the  possibility th at a  NW S-state could ex p o se  itself to  a 
nuclear strike for th e  sake  of ano ther sta te . Given the possibility th at deterrence 
could fail and  lead to  nuclear attack, it is unlikely that a  N W S-state will apply a 
blanket de te rren t over s ta te s  which it d o es  not consider critical to its vital national 
in terests. Put differently, m ost N W S-states a re  not willing to risk nuclear w ar or 
conventional war in order to ensure  the security of every non-nuclear weapon state.
In Northeast Asia, only a  firm U.S. commitment to  the security of both South
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Korea and Jap an  is likely to  prevent regional nuclear diffusion. The U.S. is unlikely, 
however, to  replace th e  nuclear umbrella over Taiwan or over every o ther imperiled 
N N W S-state that is th rea ten ed  by a  nuclear-arm ed salient other. As a  result, 
nuclear diffusion is likely in any  a re a  ab sen t ex tended  security g u a ran tees  and 
given a  high d e g re e  of susceptibility betw een salient others.
A More Radical StrategjLto Impgdg Diffusion
Policies which focus strictly on technical denial will m ost likely be  ineffective. 
In addition, security g u a ran tees  could b e  insufficient or lack credibility. The final 
course  of action su g g ested  in light of the  limitations of the  previous two strateg ies 
is the  need  to encourage  g reater reapproachm ent am ong salient others. The goal 
of a  strategy of regional reapproachm ent is to foster complex cooperative relations 
am ong all salient o thers. In other words, if exogenous nuclear threat d o es  feed the 
diffusion dynamic, rem ove the  perceptions of th rea t that feed s  the  dynamic.
The logic of th e  cooperative stra tegy  is b a sed  on neo-functionalist thinking 
which holds that the  prospect for in terstate conflict is reduced am ong nations that 
sh a re  intricate and complex cooperative relations. T he radical nature of the  strategy 
is that it h as  never been  recognized a s  an  actual way of preventing proliferation or 
th e  dynam ic of nuclear diffusion. Implementing this stra tegy  may prove difficult 
b e c a u se  a  region, like N ortheast Asia, could prove resistan t to m easu res  that
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en co u rag e  intra-regional cooperation.
N ortheast Asia's overall relations remain both susp icious and  ten se . For 
example, North and South Korea began talks to denuclearize the  Korean peninsula 
in 1991, but North Korea's recent nuclear actions complicate this possibility. Japan, 
a  s ta te  d ependen t on foreign trade, exported less in 1989 in percen tage  term s with 
China, Korea, and  Taiwan, then  it had in 1935.® T he recen t 1993 nuclear accord 
with North Korea w as m et with questions concerning its effectiveness a s  a 
nonproliferation m easure  an d  with respect to how much th e  th ree  benefactors, 
Jap an , South Korea, and th e  United S tates, "will have to pay  under the...accord ."’® 
A failure to cooperate m ay then  m ake future nuclear diffusion within Northeast Asia 
alm ost unavoidable.”
A-Closing-Obseryation
The future of nondiffusion-type strateg ies have yet to be  defined. The 
su c ce ss  of any one of th ese  three strategies is d ependen t upon th e  willingness and 
the ability of all s ta te s  to cooperate  tow ards the  goal of nonproliferation. 
Realistically, it is unlikely th a t effective mitigation will su cceed  since  susceptibility
 ̂Friedberg, op. cit., p. 270.
Jim Mann, "U.S. and Allies Debate Costs of N. Korea Deal," Los Angeles Times p. AI 
Ibid. p. 21.
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is not mitigated u n less th e  insecurity of the  imperiled is som ehow  am eliorated. 
Nuclear diffusion, therefore, m ay erupt b e c au se  no o ne  stra tegy  su c ce e d s  unless 
it m itigates a  NNW S-state’s  susceptibility to th e  nuclear contagion.
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Chapter 9 ; A Concluding Statement
The phenom ena of nuclear diffusion is bom  from an  international an d  regional 
environm ent th a t is im m ersed and  fram ed by th e  co n seq u en ces  of anarchy. T he seeds 
of future nuclear diffusion a re  brought to  fruition b e c au se  the risks a sso c ia ted  with 
anarchy  se rv e  to fuel th e  conditions th at perpe tua te  susceptibility to infection by the 
nuclear contagion. This constancy  of insecurity, which a rise s  out of anarchy, combines 
with unm itigated external nuclear th rea t to enco u rag e  nuclear em ulation and  the  
p h en o m en a  of nuclear diffusion.
The m anner in which the  first five N N W S-states developed nuclear capabilities 
reinforced th e  assum ptions of nuclear diffusion theory. T h e  theory of diffusion w as 
b ased  on a  sim ple assum ption th at an  initial act of proliferation will b eg e t a  further act 
or a c ts  of proliferation under certain ex traneous conditions. The simplicity of this logic 
is beguiling, however.
N uclear diffusion develops within a  stra teg ic  context of ex o g en o u s and 
unm itigated nuclear threat. Insecurity a c ts  a s  the  breeding ground for susceptibility 
from which th e  nuclear contagion thereby  infects certain NN W S-states. Of course, 
susceptibility and  emulation a re  not certainties a s  imperiled NN W S-state can  pursue 
options o ther than  nuclear w eapons. Hov/ever, once th e  NN W S-state develops a
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s e n se  of inadequacy, it b eco m es  extrem ely difficult to  restore a  preferable power 
balance that d o e s  not involve the ac t of proliferation.
The analysis of th e  first p h ase  dem onstrated th at e a ch  su b seq u en t ac t of 
proliferation w as in resp o n se  to  prior a c ts  of nuclear developm ent. In each  instance an 
initial nuclear stimuli w as identified a s  driving su b seq u en t a c ts  of horizontal 
proliferation. As a  result, five former NN W S-states w ere driven by their own 
susceptibility to  becom e nuclear w eapons s ta tes. In the  seco n d  phase, however, the 
NPT regim e forced an end  to overt declarations and  contributes to the  p resen t 
m isperception th a t only five capab le  nuclear w eapons s ta te s  exist.
Currently, over 40  s ta te s  have what is a  latent nuclear w eap o n s option. The 
num ber of latent nuclear w eap o n s pow ers sug g est th a t th e  ch an ce  for nuclear diffusion 
rem ains significant. Future nuclear diffusion d ep en d s on w hether insecurity and 
nuclear th rea t shall im m erse th e  operating environm ent of a  nuclear w eap o n s capable  
s ta tes. Within N ortheast A sia, for instance, dam aging suspicions and insecurities 
remain to  se rv e  susceptibility even in spite of the end  of the  Cold War.
W hat th e  previous regional analysis showed w as th a t N ortheast Asia se em s 
surrounded by an  air of gen e ra l uncertainty that risks inciting nuclear diffusion. The risk 
of nuclear diffusion has only been  prevented by the  U.S. successfully  mitigating the 
threats th at Ja p an  and South  Korea h ave  confronted. Options th at mitigate a  NNWS- 
s ta te  from proliferating, however, a re  finite in num ber and stra teg ic  value.
T he imperiled, but capable , NN W S-states is not likely to prefer vulnerability a s  
implies an  accep tan ce  of a  th rea t th a t jeopard izes th e  very ex istence  of th e  sta te . The
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notion of free-riding on th e  nuclear a rm s of ano ther is a lso  a  questionable option. How 
valuable can  a  deterren t b e  if the  NN W S-state d o es  not have  a  c lear comm itm ent by a  
NW S-state? The free-rider option is unattractive for a  NN W S-state since it lacks the  
mitigating value of an  ex ten d ed  deterrent. Still, a s  indicated by th e  actions of Britain, 
France, and  China, ev en  extended de te rren ce  canno t a lw ays prevent the p henom ena  
of nuclear diffusion. In fact, a  w eak ex ten d ed  d e te r e n t  m ay even  facilitate nuclear 
diffusion. As such, th e  ph en o m en a  of diffusion m ay continue to  plague the  international 
system  for a s  long a s  a  sovereign-held nuclear w eap o n s-b ased  deterren ts a re  n eed ed  
to keep the  nuclear p eace .
Understanding proliferation a s  nuclear diffusion allows th e  analysis to  predict th e  
conditions th a t foster proliferation. Future analysis by experts  in national security and 
strategic stu d ies  m ust recognize the  relationship between external nuclear threat and 
subsequent acts of horizontal proliferation. Simply put, nuclear diffusion is a  useful 
paradigm  that cap tu res th e  essen tia l nature  of horizontal nuclear w eapons proliferation. 
Hopefully, the  use  of th is theory  will provide a  direction for th e  so rt of stra teg ies 
necessary  to a rres t th e  tide  of future nuclear diffusion.
Unfortunately, ev en  with intent to stym ie susceptibility, future nuclear diffusion 
m ay prove inevitable. A s P rofessor Aaron Friedberg su g g ested , a  single ac t of nuclear 
proliferation could lead to  a  tide proliferation or, in th e  p arlance of this discussion, 
nuclear diffusion;’
* Professor Friedberg does not directly refer to the concept of nuclear diffusion. 
However, his understanding of what could transpire within Northeast Asia mirrors nuclear
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The nuclearization o f Korea... could lead to a  similar developm ent in 
Japan , \which might c a u se  China to acce le ra te  an d  expand its nuclear 
program s, which could then  have an  impact on d e fe n se  policies of 
Taiwan, India (and through it, Pakistan) and  R ussia. All of this would 
influence th e  behavior of th e  United S ta te s . Similar Shockw aves could 
also travel through th e  system  in different directions (for exam ple, from 
India to  China to J a p a n  to  Korea). ^
I predict th at within next two d e c ad e s  N ortheast Asia will w itness the  rise of at 
least one overt nuclear pow er. Specifically, either North Korea, South Korea, Jap an , or 
Taiwan, will go nuclear. Personally , it is my contention th a t th e  m ost likely scenario  is 
that Jap an  is th e  next m em ber of the  nuclear club. Increasing the  likelihood of this 
outcom e is that in a  period of structural uncertainty a  future Am erican Administration, 
which is J a p an 's  nuclear guarantor, m ay b e  unwilling to justify the  cost of regional 
deploym ents and  com m itm ents in the  a b sen c e  of an  overt global o r regional th rea t 
against the  United S ta te s . H ence, the  primary mitigating force th a t prevented p ast 
nuclear diffusion is rem oved. Of course, how th e  United S ta te s  m ay act within the 
Asian thea te r is unclear.
American Intelligence reports a re  beginning to focus on China a s  a global and  
regional threat. In 1995, "for th e  first time in d ecad es , U.S. military and intelligence 
officials a re  beginning a  c a s t  a  wary ey e  a t  China a s  a  possib le long-term rival, a future 
th reat to American in terests  in Asia and the  Pacific."^ If the  United S ta tes d o es
diffusion theory’.
‘ Ball, op. cit. p. 25.
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withdraw from th e  region, o r ch o o se  to dow nscale  th e  nature  of the  regional 
commitment, e ach  regional actor, especially  South Korea and  Jap an , will have to  re­
evaluate their national security. This reappraisal could lead both of th e s e  s ta te s  to 
develop a  sovereign  nuclear w eap o n s deterren t. Should th e s e  even ts occur, however, 
the  repercussions could ex tend  far beyond N ortheast Asia.
The future nuclear actions taken  by a  se t of N N W S-states could se t off a  se ries  
of nuclear dom inoes in which s ta te s  a round N ortheast Asia, S o u th eas t Asia, and 
beyond, m ay begin to re-eva lua te  their own non-nuclear s ta tu s . My g rea te st fea r  is that 
the  pace  of nuclear diffusion, w hen it d o e s  begin, will be hard to contain within any  one 
region since num erous N N W S-states p o s s e s s  a  readily available latent nuclear 
w eapons option. If such nuclear diffusion d o es  transpire  in th e  n ea r future, the  world 
could w itness an  u n preceden ted  rise of five or ten  additional nuclear- arm ed sta te s.
In conclusion, au thor Bernard Brcdie w as initially cited for asking a  simple 
profound question - "De quoi s 'ag it il - W hat is it all about?" With regards to the  
proliferation it is all about a  NN W S-state's rethinking its relative security within an 
anarchic environm ent. A s it is, nuclear diffusion is an  unfortunate reflection of an  
international system  in which nuclear force exists a s  the  s ta rk est rem inder of w eak n ess  
and of the cost th a t a NN W S-state could bea r should conflict erupt. The ironic a sp ec t 
of the  phenom ena is that it resu lts  b e c au se  in the  p ro cess  of alleviating insecurities, a 
new  NW S-state c rea tes  th e  conditions for additional proliferation. W hat is then
 ̂ Jim Mann, "U.S. Starting to View China as Potential Enemy," IheXosJ^geles Times. 
April 16, 1995. p. A 1.
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undeniable is that the q u es t for nuclear p e a ce  begins with an  act of proliferation. 
Horizontal proliferation lead s  to  nuclear diffusion b e c au se  in anarchy the  security of the 
s ta te  is param o u n t In o ther w ords, in the nuclear age, relative security begins and 
en d s  with the  nuclear w eapon.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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